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INTRODUCTION
By the time this paragraph comes to an end, it will be protected
by copyright law. This would likely come as a surprise to the layper-
son, who probably assumes that to secure copyright protection one
must do something more than put pen to paper. But the fact is that
copyright asks only two things of an author before bestowing its bene-
fits: compose some original expression and fix it in a tangible me-
dium.1 Despite its pedestrian phrasing and amateur attempts at
alliteration, this paragraph satisfies the originality standard, and its ap-
pearance in print means it is sufficiently fixed. And that's it. Copy-
right law requires nothing more. No magic incantations need be
uttered, no orphic symbols need appear. I do not have to file papers
with some government agency, or deposit a copy with the Library of
Congress, or even affix the totemic c-in-a-circle to the printed page.
In fact, even if no journal had published this paragraph, and it lan-
guished forever in a dusty file cabinet, copyright law would still pro-
tect it.
Securing copyright protection was not always so simple. For most
of copyright's history, authors had to meet certain formal require-
ments if they wanted copyright to protect their works. Copyright did
not cover works that were unpublished, or were not registered and
deposited with the government, or failed to include a notice indicat-
ing their protected status.2 Over the last century, however, these for-
malities withered away, generally without any rigorous analysis of
1 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
2 For an account of the rise and fall of these formalities, see Christopher
Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Capyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 491-99 (2004). Sprigman's
informative article also provides a detailed statistical analysis of the historical usage of
the formalities, id. at 494-523, evaluates their constitutional stature as "traditional
contours" of copyright, id. at 528-39, and suggests ways in which they could be resur-
rected without running afoul of international copyright protocols, id. at 545-68. The
Ninth Circuit is also currently considering the constitutional question. See Amended
Opening Brief for Appellants, Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. 04-17434 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 2005)
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whether we were better off without them and with little protest from
scholars.3 Today they play no role in earning copyright protection,
and we are left only with the undemanding threshold requirements of
originality and fixation.
In an era when print predominated, this low threshold was not
particularly problematic. Mass distribution of information was an ex-
pensive process rarely undertaken by those with no plans to profit
from their creativity. The law could therefore reasonably assume that
authors who bothered to disseminate their writings wanted copyright's
protection against unauthorized copying, without requiring them to
further demonstrate their desire by filling out a form or jumping
through any other regulatory hoop. In the print era, then, copyright
could grant its exclusive property rights to everyone who met the two
threshold requirements, confident that in the vast majority of cases
those rights were fulfilling their constitutional role as an incentive to
create and share expression with the public.
4
It approaches clich6 to observe that computers have changed eve-
rything. But computers have changed everything. Digital architec-
ture has so drastically reduced the cost of creating and distributing
expression that today we can all be authors and publishers, a develop-
ment that empowers the individual and promises to enrich and de-
mocratize the content of our culture. And in some respects our new
interconnectedness makes copyright more important than ever, be-
cause there are more authors who can take advantage of its incentiviz-
ing effects and earn a living from sharing their creativity with the rest
of us.
Yet as we try to fit the digital peg of computer technology into the
analog hole of copyright law, we have seen a host of seemingly intrac-
table problems arise. Because copyright protection attaches the in-
stant an original thought is expressed in fixed form, this new
generation of authors never has a chance to affirmatively decide
whether to invoke the law's protection for its creativity. It has no op-
portunity to decline copyright's kind invitation. The website of the
U.S. Copyright Office has answers to over one hundred Frequently
Asked Questions about copyright law-including such gems as "How
do I protect my sighting of Elvis?" and "Can I register a diary I found
(seeking reversal of district court ruling that absence of formalities in digital era does
not violate First Amendment and Intellectual Property Clause).
3 Sprigman, supra note 2, at 488 & n.13.
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress power to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
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in my grandmother's attic?" 5-but tells us nothing about how to vol-
untarily forgo copyright protection. It provides dozens of different
forms for registering a work,6 but not one for donating it to the public
domain. Copyright is like a well meaning but ultimately bothersome
friend, eager to help but nearly impossible to get rid of.
And the public is poorer for it. Because copyright protection
arises by operation of law, authors who have no intention of dissemi-
nating their works gain the protection of a legal regime that assumes
they will do so. At the other end of the spectrum, millions of works
whose authors want to share their creativity but have no interest in
copyright's exclusive rights see their works automatically propertized,
even though they would be willing to give them away for free. In
short, copyright's failure to adjust at a structural level to the develop-
ment of digital architecture hinders wholly unobjectionable and so-
cially enriching uses of creative material.
At the same time that copyright limits technology's potential,
technology undermines copyright's goals. Copyright exists not to en-
rich authors, but to enrich the culture. Its exclusive rights are merely
a means to this end, an incentive for the creation and public dissemi-
nation of creative expression. 7 Defining the rights thus involves a
careful balancing act. Too much private control over copying and dis-
semination of creative works denies the public access to valuable
goods and to the raw materials needed for further innovation. Too
little control results in an insufficient impetus to produce the works in
the first place.8
Copyright law uses a number of public privileges to strike this
balance between private incentive and public benefit: a finite term of
protection,9 limited control over the aftermarket, 10 the immediate
5 U.S. Copyright Office, Frequently Asked Questions About Copyright, http://
www.copyright.gov/help/faq (last visited Sept. 8, 2005).
6 U.S. Copyright Office, U.S. Copyright Office Forms, http://www.copyright.
gov/forms (last visited Sept. 8, 2005).
7 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("[P]rivate
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts."); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("[R]eward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the
public of the products of his creative genius."); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123,
127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in confer-
ring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from
the labors of authors.").
8 Brief for Law Professors et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-
480), 2005 WL 176448, at *6.
9 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
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dedication of a work's ideas to the public domain," l and a fair use
defense for infringements that are unlikely to harm the work's market
or that provide some greater social benefit. 12 Each of these important
safeguards, however, is merely a legal entitlement that presumes cer-
tain "architectural" conditions-i.e., makes certain assumptions about
the state of the physical world. 13 And digital technology threatens the
existence of these conditions. Copyright's limited duration is all well
and good, but copy protection software does not expire. Copyright's
first sale doctrine gives me the right to share my copy of a work with
you, but streaming video never provides me with a copy to share. The
ideas buried in computer source code may as well be owned by the
programmer, for the public never sees them. And fair use is fairly
useless when access restrictions refuse entrance to the fair user and
pirate alike.
Nowhere are the challenges that digital architecture poses for
copyright more apparent than in the regulation of software.
Software's fight to be included under copyright's umbrella is over;
software has won that legal battle. 14 But the war to control access to
and use of computer programs continues on the architectural front,
where a quirk of technology allows software developers to hide from
the public the very expression that earns their products copyright pro-
tection in the first place. Copyright's longstanding assumption that
those who create expressive works will share them with the public is
thus particularly inapplicable to software.
To add insult to injury, the unsuccessful marriage of copyright
and technology has given birth to a mischievous offspring, which I
have elsewhere dubbed "technolegical" regulation-i.e., the legislative
regulation of technological behavior. 15 For example, the legal entitle-
ments of trade secret law reinforce software's technological ability to
keep its creative expression from reaching the public. The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act puts its considerable legal weight behind
the technological access restrictions and copy protection that copy-
10 Id. § 109(a).
11 Id. § 102(b).
12 Id. § 107.
13 This use of "architectural" originates in Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:
What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARv. L. REv. 501, 507 (1999), and describes a behav-
ioral constraint imposed by "the physical world as we find it, even if 'as we find it' is
simply how it has already been made."
14 See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
15 James Gibson, Re-Reifying Data, 80 NoTRE DAmE L. REv. 163, 167 (2004). If you
feel compelled to say this word out loud, resist the compulsion. If resistance proves
futile, however, I suggest pronouncing it like "technological" except with "ledge" in
the middle rather than "lodge"- i.e., tek-no-LEDGE-i-cull.
20051
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right owners use to control their digital goods. 16 The Federal Com-
munication Commission imposed a legal obligation on electronics
manufacturers to incorporate a "broadcast flag" into television receiv-
ers, so that antipiracy technologies built into digital broadcasts will be
more effective. 17 To the extent that these legal measures simply rein-
force technologies that promote copyright's goals, they are unobjec-
tionable, even praiseworthy. But when they overreach-as they often
do-they cause more harm than good.
This is not to say that regulating technology in the service of copy-
right law is always a bad thing. To the contrary, "technolegical" regu-
lation is necessary to give meaning to the balance between private
incentive and public benefit in the information age. If digital archi-
tecture goes wholly unregulated, then this balance will be cast aside in
favor of a technological Wild West in which the better technologist
prevails. 18 We will move from a world of legal haves and have-nots to a
world of technological cans and cannots, with no assurance that this
new world will be any more attentive to copyright's goals than the old
one.
Healing the wounds that digital architecture and copyright inflict
on each other will therefore require us to strike a second balance,
between authorial innovation and technological innovation. We need
to ensure both that digital architecture fulfills its promise without de-
stroying a copyright system that has served us well for almost three
hundred years and that technological quirks do not serve to expand
copyright beyond its proper place. And to strike this second balance,
technolegical regulation is vital.
In this Article, I explore how best to strike this balance and sug-
gest a purposely retrograde approach that solves our twenty-first cen-
tury problems using the nineteenth century's technolegical tools:
copyright's formalities. Resurrecting publication, notice, registration,
and deposit as threshold requirements for copyright protection pre-
vents authors and publishers from achieving technologically what they
do not merit legally, while at the same time ensuring that copyright
does not apply in contexts where it is neither necessary nor useful.
What's more, the formalities are tried-and-true copyright concepts;
they would not impede further innovation in information architec-
ture, can easily adjust to changes in legal entitlements, and are rela-
16 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
17 47 C.F.R. § 73.8000-.9009 (2004). A federal court of appeals recently ruled
that the FCC lacked the authority to promulgate the broadcast flag regulation. Am.
Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
18 Gibson, supra note 15, at 169-70.
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tively impervious to the whims of technology and the cycle of
obsolescence that could derail a more high-tech solution. In the end,
then, the proverbial layperson's expectations have a lot to offer. Re-
viving the formalities of the past will preserve copyright for the future.
Part I of this Article describes one unwelcome effect of digital
architecture, known as closed code, and explains the serious problems
that it poses for copyright law. Part II explores possible solutions to
the closed-code problem, including reverse engineering and open-
source licensing, and concludes that to the extent that these high-tech
approaches have something to contribute, it is their implicit recogni-
tion of the value of the low-tech tradition of copyright formalities. Fi-
nally, Part III paints a broad-brush picture of other ways in which
reviving these seemingly archaic remnants of the print era can solve
pervasive copyright problems-i.e., increased opportunities for cen-
sorship, an insufficiently democratized culture, and the threat of tech-
nological hegemony-that digital architecture has caused.
I. Soi-rWARE, SOURCE CODE, AND SECRECY
Most copyrighted works reveal their expression as a matter of
course. Indeed, the whole point of copyright protection is to allow
authors to market their expression to the whole world without fear of
unauthorized appropriation. An author who stashes the next great
American novel in a locked drawer not only makes no money, but also
lets the copyright clock tick down towards its ultimate expiration.
Software, however, is unique among all forms of copyrighted
goods in that its expressive content can be kept secret from the public
without impairing its marketability. In fact, software can simultane-
ously claim the protection of both copyright law and trade secret law.
Copyright protects this secret content because it is expressive, and
trade secret protects it because it is secret. And this dual protection
results not from any conscious policy decision on the part of
lawmakers, but from a quirk of digital architecture. In the following
discussion, I explain this curious state of affairs and show why the pub-
lic at large (and to some extent software developers as well) would
benefit from a regulatory regime that protects software under copy-
right law or trade secret law, but not both.
A. Qbject Code, Source Code, and a Technological Quirk
To understand how and why both copyright and trade secret law
protect software, one must first understand how computers work. At
the core of every computer is a vast collection of on/off switches,
known as circuits. By using these circuits in combination with one
2005]
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another, a computer is able to perform millions of calculations per
second and thus execute the operations that make it so useful. More-
over, in addition to providing raw processing speed, complex circuitry
allows a computer to perform a wide variety of tasks without any
reconfiguration of its physical structure. In other words, a computer
can act as a word processor, and then a web browser, and then an
accounting ledger, and then a jukebox, all without altering its nuts
and bolts-its "hardware"-in any way.
How can a single machine be so versatile? In a word, program-
ming. Users can program a computer-tell it to perform a given func-
tion-by feeding it a set of instructions regarding which circuits to
turn on, and which to turn off, and when. When users want a com-
puter to be a word processor, they feed it one set of programming
instructions. When they want it to be a web browser, they feed it a
different set. These sets of instructions are known as software.1 9 At its
most basic level, then, software comprises a related series of on/off
commands to the computer's circuits that tell the computer what
function to perform at a given time. Because software's commands to
a circuit can relate only one of two messages ("on" or "off'), the lan-
guage in which commands are expressed is binary-i.e., it has just two
characters: the number one, which represents "on," and the number
zero, which represents "off." These long strings of ones and zeros that
a computer executes are known as a program's "object code."
In the 1950s, when programmers sat down to write the software
for the first programmable computers, they wrote their programs in
object code.20 But they soon found it very burdensome to compose
any but the most basic of programs in this simplistic language. So in
1959, IBM developed FORTRAN, a computer language in which a
programmer could write much more easily.21 Other programming
languages soon followed, such as BASIC, Pascal, and C. Computer
code written in one of these languages, known as "source code," is still
mostly unintelligible to the untrained eye, but it resembles English
much more than it resembles object code and is accordingly easier to
write and comprehend. For example, in object code, a program that
commands the computer to print the phrase "Hello, world!" would
look like a long, unrevealing string of hundreds or even thousands of
19 In some contexts, the term "software" means something different from "com-
puter program," see 1 DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW § 2.06[1], at 2-115 (2005), but
the differences are not relevant here. I will therefore use the two terms
interchangeably.
20 Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
63, 71 (2003).
21 Id. at 71-72.
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ones and zeros, but in the source code of the popular C++ program-
ming language it looks like this:
#include <iostream>
int main()
{ std::cout << "Hello, world!\n";
}22
Although writing programs in source code instead of object code
makes a programmer's job much easier, it presents its own problem.
Computers only understand the on/off commands of object code.
The high-level language of source code looks like gibberish to a com-
puter, just as the ones and zeros of object code look like gibberish to
you and me. Special programs are therefore needed to translate
source code into object code so the computer can execute it.23
Here then we see the technological quirk: the hard, creative work
of programming is done in source code, but the final, usable product
exists in object code. As a result, the norm in the software industry is
to market products in object code format only. The source code re-
mains with the developer, hidden from the public. This "closed
code"24 is fine with the average consumer. Purchasers of WordPerfect
or TurboTax don't care what the source code looks like; they care
about how the program functions in its executable object code for-
mat. But as we will now see, a software developer's ability to keep its
source code secret has major implications for the way in which intel-
lectual property law protects its products.
B. Copyright, Trade Secret, and a Legal Quirk
As the emergence of high-level programming languages and the
increasing popularity of personal computers made software a major
industry, programmers became concerned about an architectural fea-
ture of computer programs that threatened to hinder their com-
modification: their susceptibility to cheap, unauthorized
reproduction. Because computers excel at processing-and thus re-
producing-ones and zeros, any computer user with a copy of a pro-
gram's object code could easily make and distribute countless
22 JOHN R. HUBBARD, PROGRAMMING WITH C++, at 2 (2d ed. 2000).
23 Converting source code into a form that a computer can actually process is a
two-step process. First a compiler translates the source code into an intermediate-
level language known as assembly code. Then an assembler translates the assembly
code into object code. Glenn J. MacGrady, Protection of Computer Software-An Update
and Practical Synthesis, 20 Hous. L. REv. 1033, 1036 (1983).
24 The use of the term "closed code" to refer to this technological quirk
originated in Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards and the
Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 759, 765 (1999).
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additional copies without any permission from or payment to the
programmer. It was therefore no surprise that soon after the intro-
duction of FORTRAN and other high-level programming languages,
software developers began to seek legal protection against unautho-
rized copying of their programs. Both copyright law and trade secret
law came to their rescue.
In some ways, copyright law is a natural fit for software. Com-
puter code consists of letters and numbers, like the "Writings" that the
Constitution refers to in the Intellectual Property Clause, 25 the
"books" that were the subject of the first copyright statute Congress
ever passed,26 and the "literary works" covered by the current copy-
right act.2 7 On the other hand, the letters and numbers of code are
not expressive in the traditional copyright sense. Books and poems
talk to their readers; they stimulate thoughts in our brains. In con-
trast, software communicates its "meaning" not through literary dis-
course, but through commanding a machine to operate in a certain
way. Software "talks" to a computer in the sense that railroad tracks
"talk" to trains. And that type of conversation, although admittedly
valuable, is not one in which copyright law has traditionally taken an
interest.
Nevertheless, despite a heated debate about whether copyright
should cover software, 28 today copyright clearly does cover any com-
puter program that meets the statute's familiar threshold require-
ments: fixation and originality. 29  Fixation is easy enough; a
programmer fixes a program simply by recording it in some perma-
nent medium-paper, a CD-ROM, a computer's hard drive, and so
forth. And satisfying the originality requirement merely requires "in-
dependent creation plus a modicum of creativity," 30 a standard easily
met by the subjective choices that a programmer makes in writing
source code of any complexity.
The ship has also sailed on whether the copyright in a computer
program covers both its source code and its object code; the case law
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
26 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124.
27 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining "literary work").
28 For cogent arguments against indiscriminately applying copyright law to com-
puter programs, see, for example, Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Com-
puter Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (1987); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The
Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 33 DuKE
L.J. 663 (1984).
29 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1246-49 (3d Cir. 1983).
30 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
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makes it clear that any creativity in source code provides copyright
protection for the corresponding object code as well,31 notwithstand-
ing creditable arguments in favor of a contrary conclusion. 32 This is
an important point, because it is object code that really needs copy-
right's protection against the unlicensed copyist. Recall the techno-
logical quirk identified above: a programmer's creative efforts are
manifest in the program's source code, but the program's purchaser
only encounters its functional object code. Because only object code
is usually made available to the public, only object code is susceptible
to unauthorized copying and distribution.
For source code, the more important protection is found in trade
secret law, a regulatory regime predicated on maintaining the secrecy
of valuable commercial information, such as formulas or manufactur-
ing processes.33 It is easy to understand how source code fits into this
mold; it is, in essence, a formula or industrial process used to manu-
facture a functional computer program, namely software in its object
code incarnation. Therefore, as long as a software developer takes
reasonable steps to keep source code secret from the prying eyes of
competitors and the public, trade secret law provides legal remedies
for its unauthorized and improper appropriation.
34
The combination of these seemingly reasonable applications of
the law produces an intellectual property paradox. Copyright law-
the regulatory regime meant to preserve and promote creativity-pro-
vides the main protection for object code, which on its face manifests
no creative expression, but which does have a functional application.
Meanwhile, trade secret law-which has traditionally safeguarded
functional, industrial know-how-provides the main protection for
source code, in which one can find creative expression.
This paradox exists only for software. The technological quirk
that makes the paradox possible does not apply to any other kind of
copyrighted work, because copyrighted works generally wear their cre-
ativity on their sleeve. One cannot sell a book or a painting or a film
without disclosing to the public the creative expression that made the
work copyrightable in the first place-the words on the page, the
31 Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992) ("It
is now well settled that the literal elements of computer programs, i.e., their source
and object codes, are the subject of copyright protection.").
32 E.g., Samuelson, supra note 28, at 745.
33 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(4) (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1980s/utsa85.pdf (defining "trade secret").
34 Menell, supra note 20, at 74.
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brush strokes on canvas, the images on celluloid.3 5 And this conver-
gence of disclosure and marketability is no coincidence. Rather, it is
part and parcel of copyright law, which exists not to reward authors
for their creative efforts but to encourage the public dissemination of
creative expression. 36 The ability of authors to profit from their crea-
tive efforts is purposefully tied to their willingness to market their
works to the public while their copyright lasts.
In other words, copyright law intends to force a choice on an
author: either keep the entire work secret and forgo profits, or market
it and allow the public to see the protected expression. Only with
software may authors have their cake and eat it too. 37 The technologi-
cal quirk thus leads to a legal quirk: copyright law makes possible the
successful marketing of a computer program without requiring the
programmer to reveal that which earned it copyright protection. As
the following Part will show, these two quirks produce unwelcome
consequences for copyright policy.
C. Consequences of Closed Code
Over the last twenty-five years, software developers have fought
and won the battle for copyright protection of software. Rather than
launch a new salvo in an old battle, then, I will take software's legal
entitlement as my starting point and inquire into how (as opposed to
whether) copyright should protect software. How does software's
unique architectural characteristic-closed code-fit into copyright's
mechanisms for balancing private incentive against public interest?
As we will see, granting copyright protection to software without re-
quiring public disclosure of its source code runs contrary to copy-
right's purposes in a number of ways. It contravenes the quid pro quo
inherent in copyright law. It impoverishes the public domain in ways
that hurt both consumers and innovators. It chills the exercise of priv-
35 This does not mean that the entire creative process is laid bare; we can't neces-
sarily tell how Hemingway went about drafting his stories simply by reading them, or
what studio tricks the Beatles used to produce a certain sonic effect in their music
simply by listening to it. But in these examples, much of what makes the work deserv-
ing of copyright protection can be readily perceived. A musical performance, for
example, provides the listener with a great deal of insight regarding the written score
it embodies, even if the written work itself is kept secret. In contrast, a computer
program in executable object code form effectively conceals those aspects of its
source code that might be called creative. See infra Part II.A.
36 See cases cited supra note 7.
37 Samuelson, supra note 28, at 710; Mathias Strasser, A New Paradigm in Intellec-
tual Property Law? The Case Against Open Sources, 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 4, 54,
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/01-STLR_4/article-pdf.pdf.
[VOL. 81:1
ONCE AND FUTURE COPYRIGHT
ileges that copyright law reserves to the public. It encourages hidden
regulation of free expression. And it presents a host of practical
problems for the efficient administration of intellectual property
entitlements.
1. Impoverishing the Public Domain
The Constitution tells us that copyright's ultimate goal is the pro-
motion of "Progress of Science and useful Arts."138  The exclusive
rights that copyright law grants to private persons exist only to serve
this ultimate goal, and they are accordingly subject to a number of
safeguards designed to further it. The most well known safeguard is
the finite duration of copyright: copyright rights expire after a set
term of years, giving the author time to secure a return on his or her
investment in creating the work, and afterwards donating it to the
public domain. 39 But other safeguards-often of greater practical im-
portance-apportion certain aspects of a work to public use even
before the copyright expires. 40 Copyright's treatment of software un-
dermines these safeguards and thus impoverishes the public domain.
Consider one such safeguard, known as the idea/expression di-
chotomy. Copyright protects a work of original authorship upon its
fixation in a tangible form, but not all aspects of the work fall within
that protection. Rather, the ideas within the work pass immediately
into the public domain-"even if they are highly original, extraordina-
rily ingenious, and exceedingly valuable, and even if they took the
author many years of effort to develop." 41 Copyright law only con-
cerns itself with unauthorized use of the author's expression, the partic-
ular way in which the author chooses to set forth the work's ideas.
42
The idea/expression dichotomy is a time-honored part of copy-
right's balance between private incentive and public benefit.43 It al-
38 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
39 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (providing rules for calculat-
ing duration of copyright rights).
40 I am using the term "public domain" in a "high granularity" sense; I include in
the public domain not just complete works whose copyrights have expired, but also
ideas and other uncopyrightable aspects of a work, whose copyrights have not yet
expired. And, as will become apparent, I view the public domain as substantive, not
formal; regardless of legal entitlements, an idea or work is not in the public domain
unless the public can actually access it. See James Boyle, The Opposite of Property?, 66
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 30 (2003).
41 Samuelson, supra note 28, at 707.
42 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
43 As the Supreme Court observed over one hundred years ago, "The very object
of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the
useful knowledge which it contains. But this object would be frustrated if the knowl-
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lows an author to demand compensation from anyone who wants to
replicate th e particular Words (or musical notes, brush strokes, etc.)
he or she has chosen to use, but permits others to freely adapt the
more abstract aspects of the work in new creative endeavors of their
own. This is a worthwhile tradeoff: copyright grants authors exclusive
rights that they would not otherwise enjoy, and in exchange allows the
rest of us free and immediate use of any ideas found in the authors'
works as raw materials for our own innovation. Thus is the Progress of
Science and useful Arts encouraged. The idea/expression dichotomy
also helps mediate the tension between free speech principles and
copyright's regulation of expression; it promotes democratic dis-
course by allowing others to communicate and discuss the ideas and
facts in an author's work without incurring liability. 44 This safeguard
has accordingly garnered support not only from those who oppose
expanded copyright 45 but also those who support it.46
For the idea/expression dichotomy to work, however, the copy-
righted content of a work must be made available. One's legal right to
develop a work's ideas is useless if one has no architectural access to
those ideas in the first place. As already discussed, this is not a prob-
lem for most copyrighted works. Authors cannot typically profit from
the expression they create without revealing it-and the ideas it con-
tains-to the public. It's hard to sell a book without giving the reader
access to both its words and its ideas. Of course, an author could
choose not to sell the book at all, keeping it instead in a locked
drawer. But in such an instance neither the author nor the public
receives the benefit of copyright's bargain-no profits for the author,
no new public domain materials for the public. Authors therefore
tend to market their expression and accept the loss of control over
their ideas.
edge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book." Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879).
44 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003); Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
45 E.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) [hereinafter
Litman, The Public Domain] (arguing that ideas and other public domain aspects of
expressive works are a vital part of copyright's viability). Litman would, I think, hap-
pily admit to being an opponent of expansive copyright. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Re-
vising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REv. 19, 40-41 (1996)
[hereinafter Litman, Revising Copyright] (suggesting "recasting copyright as an exclu-
sive right of commercial exploitation").
46 E.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv.
212 (2004) (arguing for broader copyright scope and narrower fair use doctrine but
recognizing that the idea/expression dichotomy enables optimal market entry).
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With software, however, we have a copyrighted work whose
unique architecture allows its author to profit without revealing either
its creative expression or its ideas to the purchaser. The software de-
veloper thus receives the benefit of copyright protection-the right to
sue anyone who engages in unauthorized reproduction or adaptation
of the program-without conferring the corresponding benefit on
the rest of us. 47 Whatever ideas exist in the creative source code of a
computer program remain with the developer; all the public en-
counters is an impenetrable and unrevealing string of ones and
zeroes.
This architectural singularity is particularly troublesome because
software's functional nature- places not just its ideas but also many of
its other constituent parts outside copyright's protection. For exam-
ple, programmers may try to write a program using as few lines of
code as possible, so the computer will not have to work as hard to
perform the desired task. This desire for efficiency is admirable from
a functional standpoint, but it limits the expressive qualities of the
program. Courts have thus consistently held that those aspects of
software "dictated by considerations of efficiency" are not within copy-
right's protection. 48 The same is true for programming decisions that
result not from originality on the programmer's part, but from a need
to conform to external constraints, such as hardware compatibility,
interoperability requirements, manufacturers' design standards, or
the demands of the target audience. 49 Other facets of the work, such
as any facts it contains, are also free for the taking.
50
In theory, then, software developers donate all of these unpro-
tected elements of software to the public domain in exchange for
their copyright in the remaining elements. But in practice, the source
code remains hidden from public view. The irony is striking: the law
tells us that software comprises more public domain elements than
other copyrighted works, but the architecture of closed code protects
software more thoroughly than any of its copyrighted counterparts.
Third party programmers are unable to borrow from or even see the
unprotected code and thus remain ignorant of the lessons in effi-
ciency and compatibility that the law entitles them to learn. Software
developers get the benefit of copyright protection without paying the
prescribed price to the public.
47 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 252-53 (2001); Samuelson, supra
note 28, at 705-06.
48 Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707 (2d Cir. 1992).
49 Id. at 709-10.
50 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991).
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One might argue that copyright has it wrong here-e.g., that the
law should more thoroughly protect code and donate less of
software's elements to the public domain. The case law on this issue,
however, is clearly here to stay51 and thus cannot be ignored in bal-
ancing private incentive against public benefit. Moreover, it is not
even clear that software developers would benefit from commodifica-
tion of the ideas and other public domain aspects of a program. Cop-
yright places ideas into the public domain to perpetuate a self-
sustaining state of enrichment in the realm of creative expression;
when today's innovators have access to yesterday's ideas, they can
build on what came before without reinventing the wheel.5 2 For pro-
grammers, then, the widespread availability of ideas and other public
domain aspects of software would lower development costs, perhaps
significantly. Developers' tendency to conceal source code may ac-
cordingly result from a kind of prisoner's dilemma; they might be
happy to share the ideas in their code if only they could trust their
competitors to do the same.5
3
There are two obvious responses to this point. First, some public
domain aspects of source code may be evident in the way the program
behaves when it is up and running-i.e., in its onscreen output, how it
processes data, and so forth.54 But this is only the case with regard to
certain programs and certain characteristics; studying a program's dy-
namic structure to ascertain its static structure is not an across-the-
board solution to the closed-code problem. 55 Second, revealing ideas
and other public domain aspects of a program would necessarily en-
tail revealing protected expression as well, and would thus present an
51 Altai's holdings have become the prevailing standard. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 13.03[F], at 13-125 to -127 (2004).
52 See Litman, The Public Domain, supra note 45, at 968.
53 I am indebted to Doug Lichtman for this point. Unlike commercial software
developers, Doug is happy to give others access to his ideas.
54 See, e.g., Anthony L. Clapes, Confessions of an Amicus Curiae: Technophobia, Law,
and Creativity in the Digital Arts, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 903, 943 (1994); Arthur R.
Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated
Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARv. L. REV. 977, 1029 (1993); see also
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (dis-
tinguishing between software's "static structure"-i.e., its code-and its "dynamic
structure"-i.e., the way it behaves when it is up and running), affd in part and vacated
in part, 982 F.2d 693.
55 See Altai, 775 F. Supp. at 559 ("The static structure and dynamic structure of a
program can be quite different; indeed from dealing with the behavior of a program,
i.e., operating it, one can tell virtually nothing about its text.");Julie E. Cohen, Reverse
Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1122 n.163
(1995) (criticizing Clapes's distinction between access to static code and access to
dynamic operation).
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increased risk of piracy. I address this concern in the next Part, where
I discuss the costs of hidden expression.
In short, software developers should not be able to use a quirk of
digital architecture to withhold from the public domain those aspects
of a program that copyright apportions to it; this is getting something
for nothing from copyright law. As we will see, we could correct this
error by resurrecting copyright's formalities. But first, let's examine
some other casualties of closed code.
2. The Costs of Hidden Expression
The foregoing discussion focused on the disadvantages that arise
from denying access to the public domain aspects of computer code-
i.e., the ideas and other legally unprotected elements of a program.
There are, however, other disadvantages to closed code, which result
from concealment of the legally protected expression rather than
from impoverishment of the public domain. Recall that it is not only
the public that cannot see the source code that earns a computer pro-
gram its copyright protection; even those who purchase lawfully made
copies of programs do not get access. This unavailability of copy-
righted expression not only harms the public at large, but may also
disserve the software industry itself.
First, consider the effect on the public. In a world without copy-
right formalities, we are all expected to recognize copyrighted goods
on our own. There is no government registry to consult, no compul-
sory notice to alert us to a work's protected status. So to decide
whether we may copy or modify a writing or other copyrighted work
without seeking anyone's consent, we must each examine the expres-
sion that it contains and determine whether it satisfies copyright's
originality requirement.
Making such a legal determination obviously presupposes archi-
tectural access to the work's expression in the first place. With propri-
etary software, however, the public-indeed, even the purchaser-has
no access to the protected expression. It is therefore impossible for
the public to know its rights with regard to a given program. We are
left to assume that because some software can be protected by copy-
right, all software is protected by copyright. Indeed, this is the opera-
tive assumption at the U.S. Copyright Office, which will register
computer programs based on examination of object code alone, even
as it recognizes that its lack of access to source code precludes a valid
copyrightability determination. 56
56 See 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(B) (2004) (stating that software registration
application accompanied only by program's object code will be registered under "rule
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Of course, there are certain goods that by their very nature and
complexity bespeak the requisite modicum (or more) of creative ex-
pression. If you know that a new film lasts for two hours or that an
album includes fourteen never-before-performed songs, then you may
not need to see the film or hear the album to reasonably conclude
that it contains sufficient original expression to merit copyright pro-
tection. But the same cannot be said of software, at least not as a
general matter; as discussed above, even complex programs are com-
posed of largely uncopyrightable elements,57 and many programs are
not particularly complex. What we are left with, then, is a copyright
regime that not only fails to ensure the availability of software's public
domain aspects, but also precludes ex ante evaluation of its copyright
status.
Next, consider again the effect of closed code on those who de-
velop software. Receiving the benefit of copyright protection without
revealing a work's expression sounds like a good deal for developers-
and in the end it may be a good deal-but it imposes some costs on
them as well. Foremost among these is that the development of value-
added uses for a proprietary program is limited by the economics of
the firm. 58 In other words, because no one outside the company that
develops the program has access to its source code, only the com-
pany's own employees can readily conceive of value-added modifica-
tions.59 Outside parties with an interest in licensing the right to
develop an improvement are shooting in the dark; to propose an im-
provement, they must incur significant transaction costs-e.g., per-
suading and presumably paying the original developer to reveal its
secrets-without having first seen the code, and thus without knowing
whether their contemplated improvements are likely to succeed.
In contrast, if source code were available to the public at large,
programmers everywhere could readily envision and propose innova-
tive improvements to it. Of course, a third party could not actually
prepare and market any improvement without a license from the orig-
of doubt" despite recognition that "no determination has been made concerning the
existence of copyrightable authorship").
57 Altai, 982 F.2d at 707-10.
58 For the seminal explanation of the economics of the firm, see Ronald H.
Coase, The Nature of the Finn, 4 ECONOMicA 386 (1937). See also Dan L. Burk, Intellec-
tual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CH1. L. REV. 3 (2004) (examining relationship between
economics of the firm and intellectual property).
59 See A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright than for Patent Protection of
Computer Programs, 72 NEB. L. REV. 351, 426 (1993) ("The common industry practice
of distributing programs only in object code may be having a far more inhibitory
effect on program improvement than may be attributed to patents on program
inventions.").
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inal developer, because copyright law prohibits the development of
unauthorized derivative works. 60 But a prospective collaborator would
be able to assess its improvement's potential much earlier in its devel-
opment process if it had access to source code from the start. Closed
code thus imposes costs on both the public and programmers, who
not only are forced to reinvent the wheel rather than using public
domain code, but who also cannot conceive of and propose licensed
collaborations without first incurring significant and unnecessary
transaction costs. Both licensor-developers and licensee-collaborators
could benefit from a different approach.
The obvious drawback to making source code's expression availa-
ble to the public-and particularly to prospective collaborators in the
software industry-is the increased threat of infringement. Revealing
source code clearly invites some copying that could not have taken
place in a closed-code regime. One must remember, however, that
copyists do not need access to source code to engage in copyright
law's main target (and the software industry's greatest threat): out-
right piracy. To make and distribute a verbatim copy of a program,
one needs only the object code, which is available even in a closed-
code world.
6 1
So what new infringements would result from revealing source
code? If the reverse engineering case law (discussed in more detail
below) is any indication, those most interested in a program's source
code rarely intend to create a directly competing product.62 The few
cases in which direct competition does result tend to involve more
traditional manufactured products that happen to include a software
component.63 Infringement might also occur when someone tries to
60 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
61 The exception is software-as-service enterprises, discussed below. See infra
notes 164-66 and accompanying text. These firms currently do not make their
source code or object code available and therefore might see a significant increase in
infringement if they were forced to do so. But such enterprises also have little need
to rely on copyright in the first place, because they do not market their goods in a
readily copyable form. They are more likely to find that trade secret law satisfies their
intellectual property needs and could thus opt out of formalities-based copyright. See
Strasser, supra note 37, 41.
62 Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse En-
gineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1613-14 & n.182 (2002).
63 Id. at 1613 n.182 (citing Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772
(5th Cir. 1999) (defendant reverse engineered operating system software for plain-
tiffs phone switches so it could compete with plaintiff in market for expansion cards),
and Secure Servs. Tech., Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354
(E.D. Va. 1989) (defendant reverse engineered plaintiffs "handshake protocol"
software so it could compete with plaintiff in market for secure fax machines)).
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tailor the source code to his or her own specific needs or to fix bugs-
a violation of copyright, to be sure, but one that is of less concern than
wholesale, verbatim copying. The biggest threat would be outright pi-
rates, those who alter source code to produce a competing program
whose object code incarnation looks different enough from the origi-
nal to escape detection as an infringing copy.64 But if any of these
parties wanted to procure copyright protection so as to mass-market
their modifications, they would first have to reveal their own source
code, which would expose their infringement to public view and thus
invite litigation.
In the end, one cannot know the scale of infringement that
would result from making source code public.6 5 Any viable solution
to the closed-code problem must simply remain attentive to this legiti-
mate concern and remain adaptable enough to accommodate it as it
plays out. As we will see, a new formalities regime possesses character-
istics-such as its opt-in nature and flexible access rules-that serve us
well in this regard.
3. Practical Disadvantages of Closed Code
The discussion so far has identified a gap between the goals that
copyright law espouses and the manner in which it approaches regula-
tion of software, and has suggested that public availability of copy-
righted source code would make copyright more faithful to its own
principles. The drawbacks of closed code are not all so grounded in
lofty principle, however. The inaccessibility of source code also brings
with it certain practical disadvantages in the administration of intellec-
tual property entitlements and the market for software.
For example, closed code may make it harder to access and thus
appropriate a hardworking programmer's creative expression, but it
also aids the dishonest software developer who does somehow manage
to get its hands on someone else's copyrighted source code. Because
that developer can market pirated copies without revealing their
source code, it can engage in piracy without significant risk of detec-
64 A few simple changes to source code can make two substantially similar pro-
grams appear different at the object code level. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND
THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 147 (1992); STEERING COMM. FOR INTELL.
PROP. ISSUES IN SOFTWARE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES
IN SorWARE 11, 78 (1991).
65 Lawrence Lessig, for one, thinks that "the remedy (no source code) is worse
than the harm"-i.e., less complete protection for software. LESSIG, supra note 47, at
253.
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tion. 66 A few simple changes in source code can make two substan-
tially similar programs look different at the object code level, 67 and
the aggrieved programmer cannot tell whether the remaining opera-
tional similarities result from illegal copying unless it has and invests
the considerable resources necessary to file suit and obtain discovery.
Another practical disadvantage of the closed-code system is that it
decreases the chances of preserving programs for posterity and future
adaptation. Because source code is not normally released to purchas-
ers of software, customers are often very dependent on software devel-
opers for modifications to and updates of a program. If a developer
goes out of business, its customers are left high and dry; the only part
of the program available to them is the inherently unmodifiable ob-
ject code. 68 Some mechanisms have emerged for handling this prob-
lem, such as source code escrow arrangements69 and a federal
bankruptcy provision that allows a purchaser to access source code
upon the developer's bankruptcy if an executory contract so pro-
vides, 70 but they carry their own costs and their efficacy is unproven.
Even software firms that remain in business can fail to preserve
their source code. Computer programs tend to lose their value
quickly, and firms have little commercial incentive to maintain obso-
lete software. Yet there are uses to which enterprising parties could
put source code even after its commercial utility as a mass-market
product has withered away, such as adaptation by those who cannot
afford the newer version of a program. 71 Two factors nonetheless dis-
courage the preservation of old code. First, of course, copyright's re-
strictions on unauthorized reproduction mean that third party
copying is a chancy undertaking, even for preservation purposes,
7 2
and these restrictions last much longer than necessary given software's
66 Cf Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary
Software, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 265, 285-86 (2004) (discussing difficulty in determining
whether proprietary software has stolen code from open-source software).
67 See sources cited supra note 64.
68 LESSIG, supra note 47, at 253.
69 See Jonathan L. Mezrich, Source Code Escrow: An Exercise in Futility?, 5 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 117 (2001).
70 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1) (2000); S. REP. No. 100-505, at 9-10 (1988) (stating that
§ 365(n) (1) applies to right to acquire source code).
71 See, e.g., Rob Pegoraro, Creaky Operating Systems Show Their Age, WASH. POST,
Feb. 27, 2005, at F7 (discussing programs as recent as Microsoft's Windows 95 whose
developers no longer support them and that do not work with recent applications and
hardware).
72 Copying code for preservation or research might in some circumstances be fair
use, but for reasons discussed infra Part ILA, fair use is an inadequate safeguard for
this and other issues.
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short shelf life.73 Second, and more pertinent to the issue of closed
code, even after copyright expires and a program theoretically enters
the public domain its source code is often not architecturally available
because it was never released to the public in the first place. At best, it
remains locked in some cabinet in the developer's warehouse, and
copyright law provides no incentive to release it.
Keeping source code secret also imposes costs on the administra-
tion of patent law, an intellectual property regime that has become
increasingly friendly to protecting software and thus increasingly im-
portant to software development.74 Before a patent issues, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office conducts an inquiry to determine inter
alia whether the innovation is novel and nonobvious in light of "prior
art"-i.e., previous advances in the field. A patent examiner's ability
to examine prior art is therefore crucial to deciding whether an inno-
vation merits patent protection. But because software grew up as a
creature of copyright and trade secret law, and was only recently em-
braced by patent, there is no centralized patent registry that provides
a record of past software developments. 75 Nor is there any tradition in
the software industry of publishing innovative developments in trade
journals. 76 (This should come as no surprise; one reason to keep
source code private and market only object code is to hide one's inno-
vations from others in the industry.) So when the patent examiner is
trying to determine whether a software invention is novel and nonob-
vious, he or she lacks the necessary resources on the state of prior art.
Indeed, the lack of an established reservoir of prior art for computer
programs was reportedly one of the reasons that the Patent and
Trademark Office initially eschewed accepting them as patentable
material.
77
73 Copyright endures for seventy years after the death of the author, or at least
ninety-five years when the author is an institution rather than an individual. 17 U.S.C.
§ 302 (2000).
74 Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (2001) (describing Johnny-come-lately nature of
software patents).
75 See LESSIG, supra note 47, at 260.
76 See Cohen, supra note 55, at 1178 (noting that the PTO traditionally examines
only "previously issued patents and previous scholarly publications" when trying to
determine prior art and that "much that qualifies as prior art lies outside" those ar-
eas); Stephen M. McJohn, The Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 GEo. MASON L. REv. 25, 50
(2000) (noting that "[c]omputer programming . . . has had much less systematic
archiving of knowledge" than other industries and that much of the knowledge is "in
informal form" or "intentionally kept out of the public domain").
77 Cohen & Lemley, supra note 74, at 8-9.
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Closed code also impedes competition in the software market.
Because source code is hidden, software is an "experience good"-i.e.,
even a sophisticated programmer cannot know what a program does
until he or she takes it home, loads it up, and tries it out. If source
code were visible, however, software would assume some characteris-
tics of a "search good"-i.e., a product whose features could be ascer-
tained without first using it. Search goods promote efficiency: if a
purchaser can obtain information about a product early in the trans-
action, his or her search costs are lower and the market for that class
of product becomes more competitive. Of course, one would have to
be an experienced programmer to evaluate programs based on their
source code, but increased efficiency for programmers alone would
still be a welcome development, and some programmers would share
their observations with the rest of us.
78
There are other practical disadvantages to closed code. In cer-
tain circumstances, closed code may make it more difficult to identify
and remedy a program's vulnerability to malicious viruses. 79 The un-
availability of source code has even been cited as a defense against
secondary liability in the online copyright wars, with file-sharing de-
fendant Grokster claiming that it lacked the power to filter copy-
righted works from its network "because it was a mere licensee without
access to the underlying 'source code' for the peer-to-peer software
that is the backbone of its system."80 In short, from piracy to preserva-
tion to patent, closed code causes a host of practical problems that
underscore the need for regulatory reform.
4. Free Expression and Freeing Expression
Finally, keeping source code hidden has subtle but pervasive an-
tidemocratic effects. Code is part engineering and part speech. In-
deed, if code had no expressive qualities, it would not qualify for
copyright protection in the first place. Therefore, legal regulation of
computer code raises First Amendment concerns and brings to the
fore related issues of autonomy, transparency, and accountability-
78 Cf Strasser, supra note 37, 105 (making the analogy that "[m]ost people do
not understand the normative implications of complex areas of law" but "because
there are lawyers and the media, who follow legislative and judicial developments and
inform the public of important issues, they are able to make informed decisions").
79 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Digital Architecture as Crime Contro4 112 YALE L.J. 2261,
2267 (2003) (arguing that publicizing code for operating systems makes it less vulner-
able but publicizing code for "more specialized applications with few users" may have
the opposite effect).
80 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7 n.4, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2004 WL 2289200.
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although the degree to which formal First Amendment protection
should apply to code is a matter of much debate.8' Closed code is
particularly susceptible to hidden government regulation simply be-
cause programming that the government mandates (or inserts on its
own) is hidden from users' view.
82
This is not an abstract issue, of concern only to law professors and
others with too much time on their hands. Computers increasingly
govern our interactions with one another and thus influence our daily
lives. The code through which digital communication takes place is
accordingly rife with regulatory potential. Fortunately, bits and bytes
are blind. The Internet's architecture treats the ones and zeros of a
pornographic image the same as the ones and zeros of a political tract
or party invitation; any filtering that takes place occurs at one end of
the transmission or the other, not during the data's journey through
the network. But this content-blindness is less a result of a political
judgment than of a desire to keep the Internet technologically stream-
lined, so that it can transmit the greatest amount of data with the least
amount of processing.83 With data processing capacity doubling ap-
proximately every eighteen months, 4 however, we can easily conceive
of an Internet that could differentiate among its transmissions-
blocking some forms of content entirely, tagging others for surveil-
lance, filtering others for certain recipients only, and so forth. Closed
code would render such regulation invisible to those it regulates.
In fact, one does not need to look to a parade of hypothetical
horribles for an example of the antidemocratic consequences of
closed code. Consider the controversy over proprietary software that
tabulates votes cast in federal and state elections. Because the
software's source code is kept secret, the public cannot readily ex-
amine the program for accuracy or for vulnerability to hacking and
81 See, e.g., Eduardo Gomez, "Pure Speech or Expressive Conduct?": The "DeCSS Saga"
and the Inconsistent Treatment of Computer Code Under the First Amendment, 31 AIPLA QJ.
231 (2003) (arguing that source code often receives more First Amendment protec-
tion than warranted); Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
LJ. 629 (2000) (arguing that code usually is speech for First Amendment purposes).
82 See Lessig, supra note 24, at 764-67.
83 See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REv. 925, 931 (2001)
("While the e2e design principle was first adopted for technical reasons, it has impor-
tant social features as well.").
84 This theory, known as Moore's Law, is named for Intel founder Gordon Moore
and has proved remarkably accurate since he first articulated it in 1965. See Doris J.
Yang, The Lawgiver: Gordon Moore Is Still Chipping Away, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July
10, 2000, at 38.
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election fraud.8 5 States have responded to this problem by insisting
that the developers give election officials access to the source code for
examination, 6 by requiring that a copy of the code be held in es-
crow,8 7 and by allowing individuals to petition for access to it.88 But as
long as the code by default remains off limits to the general public
(and particularly to those citizens skilled enough to evaluate it), such
measures will be of limited utility.8 9 If computer code is to be subject
to the same pro-democratic conditions as other expressive content, a
different approach is needed.
II. TECHNOLEGICAL TooS FOR OPENING CODE
Closed code causes problems both theoretical and practical, un-
dermines copyright's goals, and imposes costs on programmers and
the public alike. The following discussion explores three possible
ways to solve these problems. The first, a combination of fair use and
reverse engineering, proves too unreliable and inaccessible, but it
does demonstrate the importance of ensuring that the solution is
"technolegical"-i.e., that it directly regulates technology. The sec-
ond, open-source licensing, comes with too much legal baggage to
work for traditional copyright actors, but it serves to highlight the ar-
chitectural features necessary for a workable solution. The third and
best option is a return to the venerable copyright formalities,
technolegical tools flexible enough to open code architecturally with-
out releasing it from copyright's legal protection.
A. Fair Use and Reverse Engineering
Fair use is copyright's ultimate safeguard, an equitable privilege
that can mutate into any form needed to strike copyright's balance
between private incentive and public benefit. It should therefore
come as no surprise that courts have tried to use the fair use doctrine
to right the wrongs of closed code-for example, to excuse technically
infringing but merely temporary reproduction of computer code
when the copyist's goal was merely to extract the uncopyrightable
85 Andrew Massey, Note, "But We Have To Protect Our Source!": How Electronic Voting
Companies'Proprietary Code Ruins Elections, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & Er. L.J. 233, 234-35
(2004).
86 E.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19205 (West 2003) (setting forth specifications for test-
ing of code by Secretary of State).
87 E.g., id. § 19103(a) (West Supp. 2005).
88 E.g., id. § 19202 (West 2003).
89 E.g., id. § 19206 (limiting number of expert testers to three).
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facts within.90 The fair use doctrine thus theoretically addresses at
least some of the closed-code problems articulated above, in the sense
that it provides legal protection for certain steps that might be neces-
sary to access the public domain materials-ideas, facts, etc.-that
closed code conceals.
For a number of reasons, however, fair use is not a panacea. First,
it is too indeterminate a doctrine to provide a reliable touchstone for
future conduct. Deciding whether a given activity constitutes fair use
requires review of several complicated, interdependent, and nonex-
clusive statutory factors, 91 an intimidating and expensive undertak-
ing.9 2 In some cases precedent might provide an answer, but clear
precedent on fair use is a rare thing in the fast-changing world of
digital technology, and thus in many cases the uncertainty of the out-
come would undoubtedly have a chilling effect on socially beneficial
behavior. For instance, consider the potential third party collaborator
described above, who may need to make temporary copies of another
developer's source code to determine the viability of a certain value-
added adaptation. Although this unauthorized copying might pose
little threat to the copyright holder's interests (and indeed could ulti-
mately promote them), it is far from clear that fair use would provide
a defense; the question would likely be resolved only after protracted
and expensive litigation. The potential collaborator might therefore
not bother to undertake the project in the first place. Other examples
of a similar chilling effect abound in copyright law.93
90 Nautical Solutions Mktg., Inc. v. Boats.com, No. 8:02-CV-760-T-23TGW, 2004
WL 783121, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2004); Evolution, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, 342 F.
Supp. 2d 943, 956-57 (D. Kan. 2004); see also Assessment Techs. v. Wiredata, Inc., 350
F.3d 640, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that fair use allowed defendant to copy
copyrighted compilation if that was only way to access uncopyrighted data within);
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com., Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL
21406289, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (finding that temporary copying of copy-
righted material in electronic form in order to extract facts was fair use).
91 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
92 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187 (2004) ("[Flair use... simply means the
right to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create."); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with
Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYrON L. REV. 547, 566 (1997) (pointing
out that "fair use ... is hard to predict in advance and that it will be expensive to
prove"); Litman, Revising Copyright, supra note 45, at 45-46 (" [F]air use is a trouble-
some privilege because it requires a hideously expensive trial to prove that one's ac-
tions come within its shelter.").
93 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 92, at 95-99 (describing documentary filmmaker's
decision not to engage in a seemingly obvious fair use because of fear of litigation and
other practical obstacles). For more examples of the chilling effect that fair use's
uncertainty produces, see infra Part III.A.2 (discussing copyright as censorship).
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Second, and more specific to computer code, closed code is by
definition unpublished, and unpublished works are presumptively less
susceptible to fair use. Because the entry of a copyrighted work into
the marketplace often represents the point at which its author stands
to profit the most,94 deciding when to publish a work has long been
regarded as uniquely within the author's province (the so-called "right
of first publication").95 Unpublished works have therefore been poor
candidates for fair use because their exploitation by an unlicensed
user represents a usurpation of this important authorial prerogative.
Yet even when the author never intends to release the work to the
public-as is the case with most source code-courts maintain this
presumption against fair use.96 Therefore, even if one manages to get
one's hands on unpublished source code without running afoul of
some other legal restriction,97 fair use may be a hard argument to
make.98
Third, and most important, fair use is merely a legal entitlement;
it has no effect on one's architectural ability to access a copyrighted
work. In the classic terminology of Hohfeld, fair use is a mere "privi-
lege," not a "right," and therefore imposes no Hohfeldian "duty" on
software developers to afford the public fair use opportunities or to
refrain from keeping their source code secret.99 Fair use is fairly use-
less without the means to access the work,100 and closed code prohib-
its such access. The doctrine only comes into play as a defense, after
the fair user has somehow managed to obtain the source code.' 0 '
Therefore, even if one were confident that a given use was fair,
and had the resources to defend that assertion in court, fair use would
solve the closed-code problem only if it worked in tandem with an
94 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281, 300 (1970) ("Publish-
ers expect a tradebook to begin to return a profit within a few months of publication
if it is ever to do so.").
95 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550-53
(1985).
96 See sources cited infra notes 199-204.
97 For example, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act makes it illegal to access
copyrighted work in certain ways, even when the ultimate goal is a lawful use of the
work. See infra Part III.B.1.
98 Cf McJohn, supra note 76, at 61 (making inverse point that open-source
software is more susceptible to fair use because it is published).
99 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-33 (1913).
100 Gibson, supra note 15, at 207.
101 See Hohfeld, supra note 99, at 35 (observing that even if X has a privilege to eat
a salad, A may still "hold[ I . . . fast to the dish").
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architectural measure-some way of ensuring actual access to the
code so as to make it available for fair use. This brings us to a second
existing mechanism that can mitigate the disadvantages of closed
code: reverse engineering.
Although proprietary software developers keep source code se-
cret, they must release their object code in order to market their prod-
ucts. A clever third party can accordingly try to gain insight into the
characteristics of source code through "decompilation"-a reversal of
the process by which the original programmer converted the source
code into the object code. The first step in decompilation is to trans-
late the object code into an intermediate language known as assembly
code, using programs known as disassemblers.' 0 2 Experienced pro-
grammers can then get some idea of what source code looks like by
examining and experimenting with the assembly code.
With reverse engineering, then, we have an architectural comple-
ment to the legal fair use privilege. If one wants to engage in a so-
cially beneficial use of closed source code, one can use decompilation
to secure architectural access to the code and then employ the fair use
privilege to ward off any ensuing infringement suit. In tandem, then,
reverse engineering and fair use constitute a technolegical tool; they
serve copyright by dismantling both legal and technological barriers
to achievement of its goals.
Courts have recognized and embraced this complementary use of
reverse engineering and fair use, most prominently in cases in which a
software developer wished to make its program compatible with an-
other developer's hardware or operating system but lacked the inter-
operability specifications necessary to do so. In Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of America Inc.,10 3 for example, Atari wanted to manufacture
video games that would play on Nintendo's gaming console but was
prevented from doing so by a Nintendo "lock-out" program. Atari ac-
cordingly extracted the lock-out program's object code from a com-
puter chip and then disassembled it so as to understand the
unprotected ideas and methods of operation necessary to achieve in-
teroperability for Atari's games. 10 4 Although this process involved the
making of unauthorized copies of the program, the court held that
such copying was fair use: "An author cannot acquire patent-like pro-
tection by putting an idea, process, or method of operation in an
102 SeeJessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
185, 197 (1992). For an in-depth discussion of disassembly and decompilation, giving
examples of source, assembly, and object code, see OFFiCE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,
supra note 64, at 7, 147-50.
103 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
104 Id. at 842-44.
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unintelligible format and asserting copyright infringement against
those who try to understand that idea, process, or method of opera-
tion."10 5 The Ninth Circuit used the same reasoning in the similar
case of Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,106 holding that where a
party has a legitimate interest in accessing the unprotected ideas and
functional elements of a program, and disassembly is the only means
of gaining such access, any intermediate copying that occurs during
the disassembly process is privileged as a fair use.
10 7
Most scholars have applauded these decisions, 08 and other
courts have readily adopted their reasoning.109 And although the
facts of Atari and Sega pertained only to interoperability concerns, the
courts spoke more generally about the propriety of accessing and us-
ing public domain elements embedded in closed code. The Atari
court espoused the broad principle that the fair use doctrine generally
"permits an individual in rightful possession of a copy of a work to
undertake necessary efforts to understand the work's ideas, processes,
and methods of operation."' 10 And the Ninth Circuit observed in
Sega that distribution of programs in object code "defeats the funda-
mental purpose of the Copyright Act-to encourage the production
of original works by protecting the expressive elements of those works
while leaving the ideas, facts, and functional concepts in the public
domain for others to build on."11' Several subsequent cases have ac-
cordingly allowed copying of copyrighted content in the course of try-
ing to extract the unprotected material within. 112
Nevertheless, even in tandem, fair use and reverse engineering
are not a comprehensive technolegical solution to the closed-code
problem described above, because any such solution must be both de-
pendable and accessible. But decompilation is not dependable: it is
105 Id. at 842.
106 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
107 Id. at 1520.
108 See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 62, at 1609 n.163 (collecting sources);
cf Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REv. 1177, 1230-35 (2000) (proposing fair use defense for patent law that would
cover reverse engineering of object code for interoperability purposes).
109 E.g., Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 608 (9th
Cir. 2000); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (lth Cir. 1996);
Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1050, 1056-57 (D. Colo. 1995), affd on other
grounds, 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).
110 975 F.2d at 842.
111 977 F.2d at 1527.
112 See sources cited supra note 90.
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often prohibitively difficult and inaccurate' 13-indeed, the high costs
of reverse engineering are one reason that trade secret law views it as
permissible, as the required investment of resources acts as a built-in
disincentive to undertake it'1 4-and even when it is successful it does
not reveal valuable commentary buried in the code.' 15 Moreover, the
decompiler's chances of success bear no necessary relation to intellec-
tual property law's desired balance of legal entitlements. Nor is
decompilation accessible: it takes a skilled technologist to even at-
tempt it, and there is no reason to expect that decompilers would
target those programs in which the technologically unskilled public is
interested, or would choose to share the results of their efforts with
the unwashed.
116
Fair use is not dependable or accessible either. As already dis-
cussed, the fair use doctrine works best as a backward-looking defense
113 Menell, supra note 20, at 74 ("It is very difficult and time consuming to reverse
engineer a computer program from its object code."); Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra
note 62, at 1587 n.50 ("Some trade secrets may have been serendipitously developed
at low cost yet are difficult to reverse engineer, while other expensive and time con-
suming innovations may be impossible to hide in the final product."); Pamela Samuel-
son et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2308, 2336 (1994) ("[I] n the current state of the art, decompilation is a painstak-
ing and time-consuming process."); Strasser, supra note 37, 8 n.18 (noting that
"[t]he practical obstacles to reverse engineering are not always fully appreciated in
the legal literature" and that "[t]he truth is that in today's world, reverse engineering
commercial software is virtually impossible"). Nor can we count on the science of
reverse engineering improving in the future. See Samuelson et al., supra, at 2341-42
& n.115.
114 See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 62, at 1582.
115 Some of a program's most useful ideas may be found in the explanatory com-
mentary that the programmer inserts into the source code, which does not compile
into object code and thus cannot be reverse engineered through decompilation. See
Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse-Engineering in the Real World, 19 U. DAYrON L.
REV. 843, 896 (1994); MacGrady, supra note 23, at 1065 n.148. If copyright were to
condition its protection for software on the disclosure of source code, as proposed
below, it would probably have to impose something akin to patent law's "best mode"
requirement, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000), so that developers would include in the dis-
closed source code whatever commentary they used in their own internal develop-
ment of the software. (I am indebted for this point to Alaric Fox, Associate Editor at
JURIMETRICS JOURNAL.)
116 Of course, those interested in the ideas in a program will tend to be program-
mers themselves, and therefore more skilled than the average citizen. But not all
programmers have the skills and resources to reverse engineer software, and in some
instances the unskilled general public will have an interest in accessing other public
domain aspects of a program, such as the facts it contains. See, e.g., Assessment Techs.
v. Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2003) (allowing copying of copy-
righted compilation in order to access uncopyrighted public tax assessment data it
contained).
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against proven infringement, not as a forward-looking guide for fu-
ture conduct. While the case law has been friendly to reverse engi-
neering in pursuit of interoperability, it is impossible to know whether
courts will be equally willing to give their blessing to reverse engineer-
ing for other purposes. What of the curious computer science student
who decompiles software not for interoperability purposes, but to view
(not copy, just view) its protected expression-e.g., to learn how its
developer dealt with a tricky programming issue?1 17 Would the Sega
court consider that a legitimate justification for making the unautho-
rized intermediate copies that the decompilation process requires?
Accessibility is even more suspect: would our presumably penurious
student ever have the resources necessary to bring the fair use argu-
ment to a court's attention?
Finally, even if reverse engineering and fair use were cheaper,
more reliable, and more widely available, they are unlikely to provide
the best solution to the closed source problem. Ad hoc acts of decom-
pilation would not mitigate the practical disadvantages of closed code
described above-the loss of unsupported programs, the difficulty of
assessing prior art, and so forth. Most important, being forced to em-
ploy decompilation and defend one's conduct in court begs the ques-
tion: why should the public have to jump through these hoops at all,
when part of copyright's quid pro quo is to require authors of creative
works to make their works' ideas and other unprotected elements
available? Seen in this light, the costs of reverse engineering and the
fair use defense-no matter how low-represent mere waste, the ex-
penditure of resources on something to which one is entitled free of
charge.'18 Indeed, developers also know that reverse engineering is
permitted, so they too engage in wasteful conduct by making their
products unnecessarily complex and thus more resistant to
decompilation. 119
117 Cf LESSIG, supra note 47, at 253 ("Thus, while an English Department gets to
analyze Virginia Woolf's novels to train writers in better writing, the Computer Sci-
ence Department doesn't get to examine Microsoft's operating system to train its stu-
dents in better coding.").
118 See Mark A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L.
REv. 255, 260 (1997) ("Rough estimates place the annual aggregate cost of reinven-
tion at between $2 billion and $100 billion."); Christina M. Reger, Let's Swap Copyright
for Code: The Computer Software Disclosure Dichotomy, 24 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 215, 235
(2004) ("Reinvention, in the software context, is a model of inefficiency.").
119 Cohen, supra note 55, at 1099-101 (pointing out that both Sega and Atari in-
volved reverse engineering of "lock-out" programs explicitly designed to make inter-
operability more difficult); see also Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-
Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & PUB. POL'Y 215, 236-37 (2005) (discussing the "arms race" that
reverse engineering produces).
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Thus we need to do more than tinker with the feasibility and le-
gality of reverse engineering. We need to make it entirely unneces-
sary, by making public access to a work's expressive content part of the
copyright scheme. But how do we get there? How do we make source
code available without all the waste and uncertainty that accompany
the reverse-engineering-cur-fair-use approach? As it happens, the
programming community has for some time been experimenting with
an alternative means of software distribution, one that illuminates this
question but stops short of answering it completely: open-source
software.
B. Lessons from the Open-Source Movement
1. Freeing Software and Opening Source
Closed code may be the norm for commercial software develop-
ers, but it is not the only approach that the larger programming com-
munity uses. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, a group of academics
and software engineers from loosely-controlled corporate research en-
vironments routinely shared the source code to their programs on an
informal basis and allowed others to freely make use of it. 12° This
sharing ethos not only allowed each institution to tailor programs to
its own needs, but also provided for cooperative development. For
example, a researcher at MIT might study an operating system written
by a programmer at Bell Labs or Xerox, devise ways to improve its
performance, and share those improvements with the program's origi-
nator and others in their cooperative community.
In the early 1980s, however, some of the institutions whose pro-
grammers formed this fellowship began to favor the use of proprietary
software, and the freedom to share and adapt source code suffered as
a result. 121 Particularly galling to the collaborative programmers was
the commercialization of Unix, an operating system to which many of
them had contributed: in 1982, AT&T began marketing a version of
Unix without making its source code available. 122 In direct response
to this trend toward commodification of software, Richard Stallman of
MIT founded the Free Software Foundation, an organization devoted
to creating an environment conducive to the widespread development
120 Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS.
ECON. 197, 200-01 (2002).
121 RICHARD M. STALLMAN, The GNU Proect, in FREE Sov'WARE, FREE SOCIETY 15,
15-16 (Joshua Gay ed., 2002).
122 See LESSIG, supra note 47, at 53.
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The Free Software Foundation wanted to avoid a repeat of the
AT&T/Unix experience, in which programmers had openly contrib-
uted to the improvement of a program only to see their efforts co-
opted by a commercial firm. So its first order of business was to de-
velop some means of ensuring that cooperative software projects re-
mained cooperative. Its solution was an innovative copyright licensing
scheme, which Stallman dubbed "copyleft."'1 24 Under the copyleft ap-
proach, each copy of shared source code includes a license that de-
fines the permissible uses of the program: the recipient can run the
program, modify the program, and distribute the program in its origi-
nal or modified form-but any such distributions must be governed
by the same licensing terms and are thus subject to the same con-
straints.1 25 The license therefore binds itself to the software like a vi-
rus to a host, accompanying it through theoretically infinite
distributions to and modifications by downstream programmers. De-
spite the term "free software," the license does not prohibit charging a
fee for copies of licensed programs, modified or not-Stallman has
famously analogized the "free" in free software to the "free" in free
speech, not free beer 126  but one may not distribute them except on
the same copyleft terms.
Although today a number of popular programs use copyleft li-
censes, 127 Stallman and the other copyleft devotees originally focused
on developing one particular program, an operating system compati-
ble with Unix. Stallman named this new program "GNU," a recursive
acronym that stood for "GNU's Not Unix."'128 In 1991, programmer
Linus Torvalds developed the final piece of the GNU puzzle, known as
the Linux kernel, and the operating system (which came to be known
as GNU/Linux) was complete. 129 The particular copyleft license
123 STALLMAN, supra note 121, at 21; Lerner & Tirole, supra note 120, at 201.
124 STALLMAN, supra note 121, at 20-21.
125 Id. at 20.
126 RICHARD M. STALLMAN, Free Software Definition, in FREE SOFTinWARE, FREE SOCIETY,
supra note 121, at 41, 41.
127 Some of the most well known are the Apache web server, the Per] program-
ming platform, and the Sendmail e-mail transfer agent. Yochai Benkler, Coase's Pen-
guin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 371-72 (2002).
128 STALLMAN, supra note 121, at 17. The use of recursive acronyms like GNU was
a tradition in Stallman's programming community. Id. Notwithstanding the pun in
the title of this Article's next subsection, GNU is pronounced "guh-NEW." RICHARD
M. STALLMAN, Free Software: Freedom and Cooperation, in FREE SorrWARE, FREE SOCIETY,
supra note 121, at 155, 162.
129 STALLMAN, supra note 121, at 26.
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under which it was distributed was called the GNU General Public
License (GNU GPL)-the first of what became known as the open-
source licenses.
130
Over time, as the open-source community expanded, it devel-
oped other licenses, some of which were much more liberal than the
GNU GPL in the downstream uses they permitted. For example, a
spin-off group of programmers formed the Open Source Initiative
(OSI), which will certify licenses that allow a downstream programmer
to incorporate the licensed software into a proprietary program that
he or she then releases under a different, potentially more restrictive
license-e.g., one that allows no access to or modification of the
source code.' 3 ' The OSI is thus less doctrinaire in its views than the
copyleft devotees; it sees shared source code and a nonproprietary ap-
proach to software as advantageous on a pragmatic level and reconcil-
able with commercial interests, whereas Stallman and his colleagues
view their ethos as morally compulsory and incompatible with
commodification.1
3 2
2. Something Old, Something GNU
The open-source approach to software development has inspired
much commentary on the challenge it poses to software's established
commodification model and to the traditional copyright assumption
that exclusive property rights are a sine qua non of the creative pro-
cess. 13 3 For present purposes, however, what is most interesting about
the open-source model is its innovative, homegrown approach to solv-
ing the closed-code problem. To fully appreciate what this model
does and does not have to offer in this regard, one must first under-
stand the intricacies of its licensing scheme.
130 For the text of the GNU GPL, see Free Software Found., GNU General Public
License (1991), available at http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.html. "Open source" has
become the conventional term used to describe the entire community of cooperative
programmers, including the copyleft devotees-much to Stallman's dismay. See RICH-
ARD M. STALLMAN, Why "Free Software" Is Better than "Open Source," in FREE SoFTrWARE,
FREE SOCIETY, supra note 121, at 55, 55-56.
131 Lerner & Tirole, supra note 120, at 202.
132 Zittrain, supra note 66, at 275-76; see also ROD DIXON, OPEN SOURCE SovrwARE
LAW 7-8 (2004) (discussing OSI's origins and attitudes); STALLMAN, supra note 130,
at 55 (setting forth Stallman's argument on the superiority of his approach); Open-
Source.org, History of the OSI, http://www.opensource.org/docs/history.php (last
visited Sept. 8, 2005) (explaining OSI's more pragmatic approach).
133 E.g., Benkler, supra note 127; Lerner & Tirole, supra note 120; David Mc-
Gowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241.
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Start with the notion that copyright licenses do not have to be
contractual in nature; copyright imposes restrictions on everyone, not
just on those with whom the copyright owner can claim contractual
privity.1 3 4 Federal statute, not contract law, forbids us to do certain
things with a copyrighted work-copy it, modify it, distribute it, per-
form or display it publicly-without the permission of the copyright
owner.1 3 5 So the law's default rule with regard to such conduct favors
prohibition, not freedom. In order to procure the legal freedom to
engage in these otherwise forbidden activities, one usually needs to
contact the copyright owner and obtain his or her consent. Some-
times this transaction will be contractual, as when the copyright owner
demands payment in exchange for the permission. But sometimes
the copyright owner will simply grant a license to copy or modify-a
"permission to commit some act that would otherwise be unlaw-
ful"136-without requiring any consideration or establishing any con-
tractual privity.
137
Open-source licenses follow this model. Suppose a programmer
adds his or her own code to the GNU/Linux operating system and
then releases the resulting product in object code format only. By
distributing the modified program without making its source code
available, the programmer has infringed the GNU/Linux copyright,
because the license that accompanies the GNU/Linux software (the
GNU GPL) grants permission to make and distribute modified ver-
sions only if those versions are distributed under the same terms as
the original program, and those terms require accessible source code
in downstream modifications. 138 And if the programmer tries to es-
134 See DIXON, supra note 132, at 24 (pointing out that contractual privity tends not
to be an issue in open-source licensing because end-users usually have no right to
copy or modify code absent a license).
135 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. II 2002). The statute does not actually use the term
"modify"; it refers instead to the preparation of "derivative works" based on the origi-
nal copyrighted work. Id. § 106(2).
136 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 931 (7th ed. 1999).
137 For example, refer to the license set forth on the first page of this article. It
gives individuals permission to make and distribute copies of this Article for educa-
tional purposes, subject to certain attribution and downstream licensing require-
ments. Students who see this license and make copies of this Article for use in class
will therefore not be liable for copyright infringement. But if one were to exceed the
terms of this license by, say, substantially altering my text and selling the modified
copies, I could sue for infringement, because that conduct implicates a copyright pre-
rogative-modification-for which my permission has not been given. (Perhaps one
could also characterize the transaction proposed in my first footnote as contractual,
but one would not have to do so in order to use the remedy that copyright provides.)
138 Free Software Found., supra note 130. Not all open-source licenses contain
these same restrictions, but the GNU GPL is by far the most popular of those licenses.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
cape infringement liability by arguing that the GNU GPL does not
apply, then he or she has just abandoned the only argument that
would have made the modification legal in the first place; without the
GPL's protection, the modification is unlicensed and infringing.13 9
Open-source licenses thus cleverly enlist copyright law to pro-
mote their own unorthodox purposes. Despite the movement's occa-
sional anticopyright rhetoric, 140 copyright is vital to its success. That
aspect of open-source with the best claim at being revolutionary-its
explicit, uncompensated invitation to downstream users to adapt and
improve the product-is achieved through a viral sequence of tradi-
tional licenses that draw their power from the same copyright rights
that the movement seeks to dilute.141 If those exclusive rights did not
exist, computer programs would be in the public domain, and any
programmer could modify source code and distribute the resulting
program in object code format only, without securing any license-
contrary to the copyleft ethos. The GNU GPL and similar new, inno-
vative licensing schemes thus promote the availability of source code,
but only because of copyright law's old, established exclusive rights in
expression.
So is open-source licensing the solution to the closed-code prob-
lem? It is certainly true that if all programmers release their programs
under the GNU GPL or a similar license, then source code will always
be exposed for all to see. The ideas, facts, and other public domain
aspects of the work will be available for the taking. Potential collabo-
rators could view the protected expression and assess whether their
improvements are worthwhile. Unauthorized copies and adaptations
will be easier to detect. Patent examiners will have a rich reservoir of
MIcHAEL A. EINHORN, MEDIA, TECHNOLOGY AND COPYRIGHT 169 (2004) (estimating
that 29,000 open-source projects out of total of 40,000 use the GNU GPL).
139 See Welte v. Sitecom Deutschland GmbH, No. 21 0 6123/04, at 8 (LG
Mfnchen I May 19, 2004), available at http://www.jbb.dc/urteil-Ig-muenchen-gpl.
pdf (enforcing GPL under German law); see also McGowan, supra note 133, at 289
("[A] downstream user who claimed the GPL did not bind her would merely open
herself to an infringement action.").
140 E.g., RICHARD M. STALLMAN, Science Must "Push" Copyright Aside, in FRE
SoFrwARE, FREE SOCIETY, supra note 121, at 87, 87-88.
141 James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Do-
main, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 65 (2003); MichaelJ. Madison, Reconstructing the
Software License, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 276-77 (2003); R. Polk Wagner, Information
Wants To Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
995, 1031-32 (2003).
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prior programming art to draw on.142 In short, all the disadvantages
of the closed-code system will disappear.
But open source has one obvious drawback: it does not work for
software developers who want to sell their products for a profit. In-
deed, even if a for-profit software firm were willing to provide a copy
of its source code with every copy of object code that it sells, it could
not adopt the viral open-source approach, because the latter makes it
impossible to control the acts of copying and modification that allow a
firm to generate revenue. The closest a for-profit firm could come to
viral distribution would be the shareware model, which relies on vol-
untary compliance with an inherently unenforceable pricing scheme,
or the bundling model, in which software is given away for free but
support services or other extras cost money. These models have met
with some success but have not succeeded in replacing the proprietary
closed-code approach.' 4
3
Even the less restrictive open-source licenses that focus more on
making source code available and less on ridding the software world
of copyright entitlements will not do the trick. Consider the Berkeley
Software Distribution (BSD) license, the most venerable of the more
permissive licenses. Unlike the GNU GPL, the BSD license does not
require downstream modifiers to release the source code to their
modifications.1 44 Code initially developed under the license has thus
been appropriated into commercial closed-code projects, such as the
Macintosh OS X operating system. 145 The BSD license does, however,
grant permission to make copies and modify the code-an activity
142 Indeed, the open-source community has already made some efforts to establish
a centralized collection of prior art. See DAN RAVICHER, OSRM POSITION PAPER: MITI-
GATING LINUX PATENT RISK 4 (2004), available at http://www.osriskmanagement.com/
pdf-articles/linuxpatentpaper.pdf (discussing open-source community's efforts to
build "arsenal of prior art" in order to provide PTO with basis to reject software pat-
ent applications); see also Cohen, supra note 55, at 1179 (discussing Software Patent
Institute's similar efforts); Strasser, supra note 37, 46 (proposing providing patent
examiners with "powerful, constantly updated databases" of source code).
143 For example, the wildly popular closed-code computer game Doom was distrib-
uted as shareware; the public could copy, distribute, and play the first part of the
game for free but had to pay to access the rest. SeeJames Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual
Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DuKE L.J. 87, 104 (1997). And Red Hat, Inc.
makes money by bundling documentation and support services with open-source
software. Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L. REv. 793,
834 (2001).
144 For a copy of the BSD license, see OpenSource.org, The BSD License, http://
www.opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php (last visited Sept. 8, 2005).
145 David S. Evans & Bernard J. Reddy, Government Preferences for Promoting Open-
Source Software: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REt.
313, 353 (2003).
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that would otherwise violate the original programmer's copyright.
One therefore cannot use the BSD license to make source code availa-
ble without simultaneously surrendering some of the very legal rights
that allow developers to charge for their efforts.
Seen in this light, it is the very ingenuity of the open-source
scheme that makes it inappropriate for achieving the more modest
goal of solving the closed-code problem. The genius of open-source
licensing is its viral nature-the absence of any need to contact the
copyright owner directly for permission to copy, adapt, and so forth as
long as one stays within the terms of the license. But if a "license"
provides only the right to view the source code (rather than copy or
modify it), then there is no license at all, because no copyright permis-
sion is ever needed simply to look at copyrighted content. There is no
license if there is no legal right forsaken.
3. Something Borrowed, Something Not Borrowed
By definition, then, open-source licenses do more than open up
source code. They also require software developers to surrender legal
entitlements, such as the right to control (and thus profit from) the
making of copies and downstream modifications. Indeed, that is the
whole point of copyleft's overtly dogmatic approach to software devel-
opment: it sees copyright law-at least as applied to software-as a
fundamentally unsound and unneeded theory of propertization, like
Kafka's cage that went in search of a bird. 146 The open-source move-
ment uses the law only to encourage programmers to contribute to a
collective effort that transcends any individual's self-interest.
Self-interest, however, has proven to be a good motivator over
hundreds of years of copyright history. The fact that it might not be
necessary in every circumstance or indispensable to every industry
does notjustify its wholesale abandonment as copyright's legal under-
pinning.1 47 Requiring commercial software firms to surrender these
legal entitlements is therefore unfair; expecting them to do so volun-
tarily is unrealistic. 148 On the other hand, the architectural achieve-
146 "Ein Kdfig ging einen Vogel suchen." FRANz KAFKA, HOCHZEITSVORBER-
EITUNGEN AUF DEM LANDE UND ANDERE PROSA AUS DEM NACHLA3 41 (Max Brod ed.,
1953), translated in WEDDING PREPARATIONS IN THE COUNTRY AND OTHER POSTHUMOUS
PROSE WRITINGS (Ernst Kaiser & Eithne Wilkins trans., Secker and Warburg 1954).
147 See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 133, at 284-87 (discussing circumstances under
which open-source development might not be as successful as its alternatives).
148 This is not to say that commercial firms will never embrace open-source li-
censes; several have done so, or have even released their code into the public domain.
E.g., Jonathan Krim, IBM To Help Open-Source Developers, WASH. POST,Jan. 11, 2005, at
E5 (detailing IBM's decision to allow hundreds of its patents to be used in open-
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ment of the open-source approach-making code public-is
something that copyright law should embrace.
What we need to do, then, is separate the legal from the architec-
tural. A programmer cannot modify a program without architectural
access to its source code, even if he or she has legal permission to do
so. So without architectural access to the source code, a license to
modify a program is useless. But the reverse is not true: one could
release the source code of a program to the public, and thus permit
architectural access thereto, without also granting the public any legal
right to copy, modify, or distribute it. The closed-code problem can
therefore be resolved by making the code architecturally accessible
without forcing programmers to surrender the legal entitlements that
copyright provides. In other words, copyright should embrace the ar-
chitectural freedom that open source promotes but reject the radical
legal freedoms that make open-source licensing effective.1 49
So what architectural tools does the open-source movement use?
It turns out that in this respect, as in its legal aspects, open source
represents a return to traditional copyright principles rather than a
revolution against them. In fact, it harkens back to copyright con-
cepts that proprietary firms would consider quite antiquated: most no-
tably the formality of publication, but also the notice formality.
Take publication first. The central tenet of the open-source
ethos is that source code must accompany every copy of the pro-
gram-no more distributing software in object code alone. This is
also the essence of the publication formality, the traditional notion
that making creative expression available should be part of the distri-
bution process that copyright promotes. Indeed, until 1976, federal
copyright law did not protect a work until it was published (i.e., pub-
source programs). These firms may have realized that in industries characterized by
incremental innovation and in which significant revenue is expected to come from
path-dependent developments, publishing research may sometimes make more sense
than seeking intellectual property protection. See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. REv. 1857 (2003). Or they
may support open source so as to prevent a rival from cornering an important market.
See Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 183,
191-93 (2004). Yet such instances remain the exception rather than the rule.
149 See Strasser, supra note 37, 57 (noting that these two aspects of open source
"are not the same, and, as a conceptual matter, it is important to keep them sepa-
rate"). But see Reger, supra note 118, at 237-43 (advocating use of legal aspects of
open-source approach to achieve architectural goals); Massey, supra note 85, at 240 &
n.38 (assuming that providing source code to public necessarily involves "loss of intel-
lectual property protection").
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licly distributed in a fixed form).150 Even after 1976, copyrighted
works could not as a practical matter be marketed without simultane-
ously revealing their creative content, at least to the purchaser-ex-
cept, of course, in the case of software. By structuring software
transactions so that source code is always available, then, open-source
licensing simply brings software back into the copyright fold.1 51 Seen
in this light, open-source, even in its most doctrinaire copyleft incar-
nation, is decidedly old-school. 152 If we reinstate publication as a
threshold requirement for copyright protection, then, we extract the
architectural advantage that open source provides without paying
open source's radical legal price-the surrender of a copyright enti-
tlement. Thus is the closed-code problem solved.
Of course, characterizing this proposal as less than radical may
seem strange to the developer of proprietary software, who has long
been accustomed to benefitting from copyright protection while keep-
ing source code hidden. But by conditioning copyright protection on
the publication of source code, the law puts software developers in no
worse a position than authors of other expressive works in digital
form. Copyright evolved under the assumption that authors could
profit from their creativity only by sharing it with the public; the law
accordingly granted them exclusive rights over their creative expres-
sion in return for public access to that expression, and to the ideas
and facts it contained. Returning to that model cures-rather than
causes-a problem with how copyright handles software.
This is not to say that the software developer has nothing to fear
from exposing its previously hidden source code. Publishing source
code will undoubtedly provide new opportunities for infringement-
although, as discussed above, these opportunities might not be as
threatening as they first appear.15 3 For certain programs, publication
150 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1976) (repealed 1976). Because the definition of "publication"
encompassed only those works provided to the public in a tangible form, there was an
exception to the publication requirement for works that could be made available to
the public intangibly-such as plays, lectures, and musical performances; they could
secure copyright protection through registration and deposit alone. See id. § 12 (re-
pealed 1976); REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: RE-
PORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW 39 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter 1961 REPORT].
151 Cf DIXON, supra note 132, at 22 (arguing that open-source approach adheres
more closely than closed-code industry to copyright's constitutional goal of progress).
152 Indeed, the copyleft approach might even be viewed as the most traditional
open-source licensing permutation, in that it compels downstream programmers to
reveal their source code, whereas more permissive licenses like the BSD license simply
allow or encourage them to do so.
153 See supra Part I.C.2.
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of source code might also increase vulnerability to hacking and vi-
ruses. 154 The publication formality should therefore be carefully tai-
lored to balance its benefits against these drawbacks.
One way to strike this balance is to adopt another architectural
feature of open-source licenses, namely the requirement the license
itself feature prominently in any distribution of the software it gov-
erns. This provision exposes downstream users to the license when
they first obtain the software so they can immediately understand what
rights they do and do not have with regard to it. In other words, be-
cause open-source licensing depends not on the bilateral nature of
contract law but on unilateral permission to use the code in a certain
way, its operative precondition is purely architectural: can the down-
stream user see the license? Open-source licenses thus not only regu-
late copyright entitlements but also serve a notice function, and it is
this indispensable notice function that makes the viral nature of open
source possible. The notice allows downstream users to copy, modify,
redistribute, etc.-whatever the license allows-without having to seek
out the copyright owner to determine what conduct is and is not
permitted.
As with publication, using notice to inform the public of its rights
and responsibilities with regard to expressive works is nothing new in
copyright law. In fact, it is quite old. It has been a part of copyright
law since the first Congress, 155 and until 1989 the failure to affix a
notice to a published copyrighted work meant that the work entered
the public domain. 156 The familiar c-in-a-circle, followed by the year
of publication and the name of the copyright owner, served to inform
the public that it was dealing with something laden with legal restric-
tions, that there were certain things it could and could not do with the
work. What the open-source licensing scheme has done is resurrect
this quaint formality and cleverly adapt it so that an individual
programmer can use it to further his or her sharing ethos.
154 See Katyal, supra note 79, at 2267 (arguing that publicizing code for operating
systems makes it less vulnerable but publicizing code for "more specialized applica-
tions with few users" may have the opposite effect).
155 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 143 (1976).
156 For works published between 1978 and 1989, a copyright owner had five years
to cure its failure to affix the notice. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (2000). Before 1978, the
failure was instantly fatal to the work's copyright. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 233
(1990); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 143 (1976). The current act retains a notice provi-
sion, but affixing a notice no longer affects a copyright's validity; notice merely makes
it harder for an infringer to reduce damages by arguing that the infringement was
innocent. 17 U.S.C. § 405(b).
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Combining notice and publication results in a more flexible
technolegical tool that can assuage some of the software developer's
concerns. For example, resurrecting publication as a precondition to
copyright protection would not necessarily mean that each copy sold
would contain both the object code and the source code; most pur-
chasers would probably not care about the latter. Instead, the law
could use a notice formality to trigger the publication obligation: each
copy of object code could bear a notice informing the purchaser how
to contact the developer to obtain a copy of the source code, just as
the traditional copyright notice identified the party to be contacted if
a license was desired. This approach would limit possession of the
code to authorized purchasers, at least in the first instance-as is the
case with other copyrighted works. The developer would also know
who had obtained copies of its code and could draw up a list of sus-
pects if infringement or hacking ensued.
An alternative approach would be to use copyright's two other
traditional formalities, registration and deposit, as threshold require-
ments for procuring a software copyright. Current law contains regis-
tration and deposit provisions, but they are of secondary importance
at best. The U.S. Copyright Office will register software without even
seeing its source code,1 57 and registration of any work is unnecessary
unless the copyright owner intends to file an infringement action. 158
And although today's copyright regulations do require deposit of pub-
lished works with the Library of Congress, the lack of consistent en-
forcement and the toothless consequences of noncompliance render
these regulations ineffective. 159
Resurrecting these two formalities would result in a larger copy-
right bureaucracy, but it has the benefit of giving policymakers the
option of opening source code to parties other than purchasers of the
program, in effect establishing a national archive of code. Access to
the archive could be completely unregulated if the benefits to the
public were deemed important enough-the electronic voting ma-
chine example comes to mind-or could be restricted to privileged
groups, such as patent examiners researching prior art or those who
157 See supra note 56.
158 17 U.S.C. § 411 ("[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made
in accordance with this title."). As its language clearly indicates, this provision applies
only to U.S. works; works that originate abroad do not have to register even as a
precondition to bringing suit.
159 See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 51, § 7.17[B], at 7-190.1. to -.3.
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establish their fair use bonafides. 160 Or the archive copy could remain
off limits to all comers until expiration of its copyright, which would
address (at least in part) the threat that closed code poses to the pres-
ervation of obsolete or unsupported programs. 161 Moreover, if regis-
tration were a precondition to earning the right to affix a notice and
involved substantive examination of the source code for originality,
then those citizens who lack the skill to evaluate the code themselves
(as most of us do) would have some assurance that a program bearing
a notice was copyrighted.
There are tradeoffs inherent in all of these examples. Some in-
crease the chances of infringement in order to overcome the draw-
backs of closed code, while others have the opposite effect. The goal
here is not to settle on one option as optimal, but to demonstrate the
adaptability inherent in this approach to closed code. Using copy-
right's traditional formalities as technolegical tools both focuses
policymakers on copyright's intended balance and gives them the
freedom to craft more radical or less radical solutions, as they see fit.
Yet whenever policymakers use architectural means to promote a
legal goal, they must take care not to make unwarranted assumptions
about the current and future state of digital architecture and the tech-
nology of software creation and distribution. For instance, the tradi-
tional definition of publication is tied to the notion that copyrighted
works will mainly be marketed in individual, stand alone copies. 162
160 One commentator suggests an opt-in, two-tiered system of copyright protection
for source code, with a short period of true exclusivity followed by a period in which
the code is filed with a government agency and is available for inspection by anyone.
Anthony J. Mahajan, Note, Intellectual Property, Contracts, and Reverse Engineering After
ProCD: A Proposed Compromise for Computer Software, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 3297, 3331-35
(1999). If you object to a government agency's deciding who can and who cannot
access library materials (or to its tracking of patrons' comings and goings), keep in
mind that such an approach would serve as a supplement to-not a substitution for-
traditional fair use entitlements and other public prerogatives. For example, one
would still be permitted to obtain a copy of a work in the market and engage in fair
use without accessing the deposit copy. See infra notes 286-88 and accompanying
text.
161 See LESSIG, supra note 47, at 253 (proposing deposit of escrow copy of software
as condition of copyright protection). Of course, copyright's duration far exceeds the
useful life of any computer program, so the benefit of preserving a copy of a program
until the end of its copyright term is speculative at best. But as I will discuss later,
formalities can solve this problem as well, and not just for software. See infra Part
III.A.3.c.
162 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining publication as "the distribution of copies or pho-
norecords of a work to the public"). This definition generally codifies the longstand-
ing meaning of the term in copyright law. I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 51, § 4.04,
at 4-20.
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Thus a work is not considered "published" if it is merely performed or
displayed publicly. 163 But in an age of digital networks and high
bandwidth, information goods are likely to be distributed more and
more through real-time, on-demand transmission and less and less in
fixed, tangible copies. The most familiar example is the streaming
audio and video known to most Internet users. The software industry
is also beginning to experiment with selling its product as a pay-per-
use service-rather than as a freestanding good-by housing applica-
tion programs in a central server and using high-bandwidth connec-
tions to provide them to customers on a real-time basis.'64 In that
circumstance, even the object code would remain hidden, let alone
the source code.165 The definition of publication would therefore
have to adjust to these new distribution models so as to ensure revela-
tion of their source code in some accessible form.
166
Of course, like anything that intellectual property law protects,
source code is nonrival, and therefore no technolegical tool will be
completely effective in keeping the genie in the bottle. Resurrecting
the formalities, however, would not diminish the impressive array of
legal entitlements that copyright has always provided and will con-
tinue to provide. Looking at creative content does not implicate copy-
right's entitlements at all; indeed, it's part of what copyright is
supposed to promote. (By way of example, the Copyright Office must
make available for inspection the copies that it has retained from the
registration process,167 but it restricts copying them.168) The resur-
rected formalities would thus promote public access to source code,
with all its attendant benefits, but allow software developers to exer-
cise their legal prerogative to bar copying of expression and other
163 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("A public performance or display of a work does not of itself
constitute publication.").
164 See Leslie Walker, Selling the Appeal of Renting out Business Software, WASH. POST,
Feb. 5, 2004, at El.
165 See Strasser, supra note 37, 1 41 (concluding that even object code could be
protected as trade secret in that circumstance).
166 This reveals an error in the reverse engineering case of Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of America Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843-44 (Fed. Cir. 1992), in which the court
held that decompiling a program can constitute fair use only when the user is in
authorized possession of a copy of the work. This ruling made sense given the facts of
that case-Atari had acquired Nintendo's program through a fraud on the U.S. Copy-
right Office, id. at 841-42,-but relying on estoppel or unclean hands to deny Atari's
claim of fair use would have been preferable to establishing a bright-line rule that
assumes that lawful copies will always be available.
167 17 U.S.C. § 705(b).
168 37 C.F.R. § 201.2(d) (2) (2004).
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wrongful appropriative acts. 169 And unlike the open-source approach,
it would address the closed-code problems identified above without
forcing the software developer to surrender the means to seek redress
for downstream infringement.
Nor would the formalities eliminate other useful tools in the
software developer's toolbox, such as the ability to control their prod-
ucts contractually and architecturally. Many developers already make
it technologically impossible to use their programs absent consent to
an end-user license agreement. They also employ copy protection
technologies and similar means to inhibit the unlicensed copying and
distribution of their software. The formalities would have no effect on
these significant protections. (In fact, the only legal obstacle to this
use of copyright formalities is our obligations under international cop-
yright protocols; 70 if the other signatory nations fail to see the merit
in reviving the formalities, Christopher Sprigman has already devised
inventive methods for reconciling them with the treaties'
provisions. 171)
Finally, even under a regime of revived formalities, publishing
source code will never be compulsory for software developers. They
can always choose to forgo copyright protection entirely, keep their
source code secret, and protect their efforts using other means, both
legal (e.g., contract and trade secret law) and technological (e.g., copy
protection and access controls). Software developers, like other tech-
nological innovators, already face this kind of decision when they con-
sider whether to seek patent protection for a program: they can
patent their innovation, thus revealing its workings to the public but
gaining a valuable exclusive right, or they can maintain the program
as a trade secret, thus exploiting its value without revealing it to the
public but taking the risk that a competitor will independently de-
velop or reverse engineer the innovation. 172 Copyright has long im-
169 See Samuelson et al., supra note 113, at 2407 ("A legal regime for protecting
applied know-how in programs from market-destructive appropriations should not
block access to that know-how, but merely regulate its use."); cf. Samuelson &
Scotchmer, supra note 62, at 1651 (noting in reverse engineering context that "it may
be more sensible to regulate post-reverse-engineering activities than to regulate re-
verse engineering as such").
170 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994); Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(2), July 24, 1971,
102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3.
171 See Sprigman, supra note 2, at 545-68.
172 Which option to choose depends on a number of factors, such as whether the
innovation can be effectively exploited as a trade secret, its susceptibility to reverse
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posed a similar choice on other authors: keep your creative expression
secret and forgo mass marketing, or profit from it but share certain
aspects of it with the public. It should impose the same choice on
those who seek copyright protection for software.
III. A BROADER ROLE FOR FORMALITIES
No copyrightable work other than software can profit from copy-
right's protection without revealing the expression that earns it that
protection. Closed code thus poses an important but narrow ques-
tion. Yet the technolegical tools that answer this question can address
other, seemingly unrelated challenges that digital technology presents
for copyright law as well. I focus below on two such challenges: the
folly of maintaining copyright's automatic propertization of all origi-
nal and fixed expression, and the danger that technological protec-
tions will replace copyright's careful balance of legal entitlements. As
we will see, these two problems are a result of high-tech innovations,
but they are best addressed through the resurrection of copyright's
low-tech formalities.
A. Curing Copyrightis
If intellectual property were a medical field, doctors would con-
clude that the body politic suffers from an inflammation of the copy-
right, characterized by swelling of the code, pain in the author and
user regions, and a significant loss of function. The illness can be
traced to an irritant that, if left untreated, threatens to become a full-
blown infection that may kill the copyright corpus: the ubiquity of
computer technology and digital networks. No single medication can
cure this case of copyrightis, but we can start by trimming the fat-by
ensuring that copyright applies only where it is needed.
Recall how easy it is to create a copyrightable work. Copyright's
protection attaches as soon as original expression is fixed in a tangible
medium. A copyrightable work is therefore a copyrighted work; copy-
right, as one astute commentator has observed, is not a transitive
verb.173 In an era when print predominated, this low threshold may
have been reasonable. Distribution of information goods was an ex-
pensive process rarely undertaken by those with no desire to profit
from their creativity. So although copyright might have protected, for
engineering, how long it is likely to be profitable, and whether it is likely to meet
patent's strict threshold requirements. Cf Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 62, at
1615-20 (discussing pros and cons of making application programming interfaces
public versus keeping them private).
173 MacGrady, supra note 23, at 1049.
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example, a personal letter from one correspondent to another, that
protection was of little consequence because there would rarely be a
circumstance in which the letter would be subject to unauthorized
copying, adaptation, public distribution, or other conduct that might
implicate its copyright. The architecture of information was such that
mass distribution required reification-i.e., the reduction of creative
content to a fixed res in multiple copies, with all the attendant ex-
pense that process implied.
174
The advent of broadcasting posed a challenge for this print para-
digm; for the first time, creative content could be delivered to the
public at large in a de-reified form. The resulting growing pains were
perhaps most evident in the Sony Betamax case, in which copyright
owners challenged the legitimacy of a technology that gave their audi-
ence the ability to record and reproduce individual broadcasts. 175 But
broadcasting did not completely transform the copyright landscape,
because it required even greater resources and technological sophisti-
cation than its print predecessor and was therefore similarly restricted
in practice to those with a mind to profit from their efforts. And de-
spite its otherwise revolutionary nature, broadcasting perpetuated
print media's stark division between creator and audience. It was a
one-way street.
Copyright's commodification model therefore managed to sur-
vive the broadcasting revolution because the cast of content charac-
ters did not change significantly; only the medium was different. In
contrast, ubiquitous digital networking represents a watershed techno-
logical development that does more than continue broadcasting's tra-
dition of largely de-reified content. It changes the copyright equation
along two other dimensions as well: it makes the creation and dissemi-
nation of content affordable to all, and it turns content delivery into
an interactive two-way street. (See Table 1.) Digital architecture in-
vites everyone into the copyright tent, and the traditional monied ac-
tors must accordingly make room for the amateurs. To accommodate
these divergent interests, we need a more sophisticated-and lim-
ited-model of propertization.
Two developments have had a particularly important impact on
how copyright works, or doesn't work, in a digital world. First, as al-
ready mentioned, the widespread accessibility of computers and the
networks that connect them means that the production and wide-
spread dissemination of creative expression is no longer a privilege
restricted to those who can attract the attention of a publishing house
174 See Litman, Revising Copyright, supra note 45, at 37.
175 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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TABLE 1. EVOLUTION OF COPYRIGHT TECHNOLOGIES
Medium
Print Broadcasting Digital
Need for fixed res High Low Low
Cost of dissemination High High Low
Interactivity Low Low High
or media conglomerate. Combine this with copyright's low threshold
requirements, and the result is the constant and ubiquitous creation
and online dissemination of millions upon millions of copyrighted
works.
Second, the everyday use of computer technology routinely re-
sults in unauthorized reproduction, adaptation, distribution, perform-
ance, and display of digitized content. Several courts have held, for
example, that loading a program or file into a computer's active RAM
memory constitutes copying for the purposes of copyright law, 176 de-
spite legislative history that seems to support a contrary result 177 and
vociferous dissent from copyright commentators.17 8 Under these
holdings, every time a copyrighted work is so much as viewed on a
computer screen, the viewer needs either the permission of the copy-
right holder or the protection of a privilege-even if the disk or file
from which the image is summoned was made with the copyright
owner's permission and was lawfully purchased. 179 Even if RAM cop-
ies do not implicate copyright's exclusive rights, a host of other com-
mon computer activity does, from forwarding e-mail, backing up data,
and printing a hard copy of an online document to caching fre-
176 The seminal case is MA! Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,
518-19 (9th Cir. 1993), but subsequent cases have reached the same result. E.g., In re
Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1537, 1541 (D. Kan. 1995); Advanced
Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 362-64 (E.D. Va.
1994).
177 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5666 ("[T]he definition of 'fixation' would exclude from the concept purely evanes-
cent or transient reproductions such as those ... captured momentarily in the 'mem-
ory' of a computer.").
178 E.g., James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online: A Young Person's Guide, 10
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 47, 56 (1996); Lemley, supra note 92, at 551; Litman, Revising
Copyright, supra note 45, at 21-22.
179 There exist some such privileges, such as the privilege to make such copies as
are necessary to use the program, 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (1) (2000), but none that would
excuse the full range of seemingly legitimate uses of a lawfully acquired program or
file.
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quently accessed files, cataloging Internet sites, and webcasting one's
travels.1
8 0
In tandem, these two developments produce a world replete with
copyrighted content that is constantly being infringed. Although the
copyright protection is often unneeded, and the infringement is often
unobjectionable, the legal consequences are considerable. They in-
clude a poorer public domain, the conversion of copyright from an
instrument of progress to an instrument of censorship, a failure of
digital technology to realize its democratizing potential, and a woeful
and regrettable lack of understanding of and respect for copyright
law. Fortunately, the same technolegical tools that fixed the closed-
code problem provide a solution here. Returning to copyright's tried-
and-true formalities can help restore copyright to its intended, socially
beneficial purposes.
1. The Gift and Curse of Widespread Authorship
In the digital age, we can all be authors, and we can all be pub-
lishers. Anyone with a computer and an Internet connection can
command the attention of the wired world as long as he or she has
something to say, or draw, or perform. This is a good thing. Empow-
ering individual citizens in this unprecedented fashion promises to
enrich our culture and democratize its content 1 -a development of
particular value in a time when traditional media outlets are undergo-
ing a bout of consolidation. 182 (Consider, for example, the valuable
role that amateur weblogs play as a check on and rival to mainstream
news reporting.) And in one respect this widespread empowerment
makes copyright even more important, in that more authors can take
advantage of copyright's incentives and commodify their creativity.
But only if they want to. And therein lies the problem. Because
copyright protection attaches the instant an original thought is ex-
pressed in fixed form, these newly empowered authors never have a
chance to affirmatively decide whether they want that protection. Of
course, if digital authors who have no desire to profit from their crea-
180 For a thoughtful discussion of these and other ways in which routine use of a
computer can be said to implicate copyright rights, see Lemley, supra note 92, at
554-63. On the implications of caching, see I. Trotter Hardy, Computer RAM "Copies":
Hit or Myth? Historical Perspectives on Caching as a Microcosm of Current Copyright Concerns,
22 U. DAYrON L. REv. 423 (1997).
181 LESSIG, supra note 92, at 42.
182 SeeYochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Produc-
tion, 22 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 81, 93-95 (2002) (arguing that strong intellectual prop-
erty entitlements lead to increased concentration and homogenization of information
production).
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tivity are sufficiently organized and attuned to copyright concerns,
they can manufacture their own legal escape hatches; open-source li-
censing is the most obvious example. But because modern-day acts of
creative expression are so ubiquitous and unremarkable-writing e-
mails, posting to message boards, creating websites, sharing photos
online-we cannot expect a diffuse public to take the time to priori-
tize the enrichment of the public domain or the digital commons.
For example, suppose that a regular Joe takes a break from his
two jobs and four children to write a movie review and send it to an
electronic mailing list of film afficionados. The listserv technology
that this community uses automatically makes hundreds of copies of
his review-one copy appears in the e-mail inbox of every member of
the list, others reside (at least for a time) on intermediate servers that
facilitate the transmission of Internet communications, another ap-
pears in an archive that the list moderator maintains, and so forth.
Now, one might reasonably argue that Joe authorized these copies by
sending his review in the first place, and that copyright law accord-
ingly works fine here. But what is the legal consequence when a list-
serv member decides to print out his review, or forward it to a friend,
or place it on his or her own website?
The right answer, in all likelihood, is "Who cares?" Not Joe, cer-
tainly. But copyright law cares, because copyright law protects that
movie review from the moment Joe saves it to his hard drive-or even
from the moment he types it into the active memory of his word
processing program.'8 3 We saddle Joe with an entitlement he proba-
bly cares nothing about and thereby saddle the public with three
unappealing options: invest the time and resources necessary to trace
the provenance of online content and secure its author's permission,
break the law by making and distributing unauthorized copies, or
forgo a wholly unobjectionable and socially enriching use of creative
material. We need a fourth option.
2. Copyright as Censorship
This is not to say that no injury ever results from the unautho-
rized copying and distribution of personal extemporanea. But it
tends not to be a cognizable copyright injury. Consider the example
of investment banker Peter Chung, whose overly creative e-mail to
friends about his decadent lifestyle cost him his dignity, and eventually
his job, when it left the private circle of intended recipients and made
183 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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the public rounds of the Internet. 184 Chung and others surprised to
see their private affairs laid bare to the online world can certainly ar-
ticulate an injury. The harm, however, is not the economic loss that
results from the usurpation of the right to profit from the copying and
distribution of a creative work. It is instead more akin to a violation of
the author's privacy. Concerns of that type have traditionally been the
province not of federal copyright, but of state law and its now mori-
bund system of common-law copyright. 185 The federal copyright
model grants alienable and descendible property rights to facilitate
the economic regulation of materials intended for widespread public
dissemination. In contrast, as Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
pointed out over one hundred years ago in their seminal article The
Right to Privacy,
where the value of the production is found not in the right to take
the profits arising from publication, but in the peace of mind or the
relief afforded by the ability to prevent any publication at all, it is
difficult to regard the right as one of property, in the common ac-
ceptation of that term.
186
These concerns sound in privacy, not property, and are thus not the
province of federal copyright at all.
187
Laws governing privacy should therefore provide any relief
deemed appropriate for this kind of injury. But because federal copy-
right now covers unpublished works, the state law standby that would
have addressed the privacy concerns in the days of Warren and Bran-
deis-i.e., common-law copyright-is not available. Federal copyright
law has taken its place. Thus we see federal copyright employed to
keep information from reaching the public. Rap music star Eminem
enjoins a magazine from publishing the lyrics to racist songs that he
wrote in his youth.1 88 The Church of Scientology shields its scripture
184 Editorial, How Those Cyber Slip-Ups Could Get You the Sack, IRISH INDEP. (Dublin),
Sept. 29, 2004, at 16 (recounting Chung's and similar e-mail mishaps).
185 Although state copyright law was sometimes statutory in nature, the accepted
practice is to refer to it as common-law copyright. I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 51,
§ 2.02, at 2-18 & n.1.
186 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.
193, 200-01 (1890).
187 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985)
(citing The Right to Privacy for proposition that "common-law copyright was often en-
listed in the service of personal privacy"); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 186, at 205
("The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal produc-
tions . . .against publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private
property, but that of an inviolate personality.").
188 Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enters., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 64, 69 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (finding magazine in contempt for violating temporary restraining order that
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from public examination by invoking copyright protection.189 The fa-
mously reclusive authorJ.D. Salinger prevents the publication of a bi-
ography containing excerpts and paraphrases of his writings.190
Dunkin' Donuts uses the threat of copyright infringement to facilitate
its purchase of an online forum for complaints about the company,
claiming that it could "more effectively capture the comments and
inquiries that are being submitted by our customers"-yet the original
website no longer exists, and the company's own site. provides no con-
sumer forum. 191
In none of these examples did the authors intend to publish the
works on their own; the goal was to keep them from ever reaching the
public at large. Copyright is ill suited to deal with such cases. Its con-
stitutional goal is to promote enlightenment, not retard it-"to in-
crease and not to impede the harvest of knowledge."'192 The property
rights it establishes must "ultimately serve the cause of promoting
broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts."' 9 3
Copyright law thus operates under the assumption that the author
wishes to disseminate his or her work to the public for a fee, and that
the only thing standing in the way is the threat of unauthorized (i.e.,
uncompensated) copying.
When the opposite is true-when the goal is privacy, not prof-
its-copyright often gets it wrong. Because copyright law assumes that
authors' desire for control derives from their desire to market their
works, courts presume an irreparable injury whenever infringement
takes place.19 4 This makes it remarkably easy for a copyright owner to
secure an injunction, a prior restraint on speech that would be ex-
barred it from publishing lyrics). But see Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enters., Inc.,
No. 03 Civ. 9944, 2005 WL 14920, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2004) (sending case to trial
on fair use issue).
189 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, CIV.A. No. 95-1107-A, 1996 WL 633131, at *1
(E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996); see also Bridge Publ'ns, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F. Supp. 629, 635-36
(S.D. Cal. 1993) (finding no fair use of secret Scientology texts where defendant used
them in for-profit course).
190 Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
191 Fara Warner et al., Holes in the Net, WALL ST.J., Aug. 30, 1999, atAl (describing
Dunkin' Donuts suit).
192 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 545; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress
copyright power in order to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts").
193 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
194 E.g., Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir.
1985); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984);
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1254 (3d Cir.
1983); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620 (7th Cir.
1982).
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ceedingly difficult to get outside the copyright context.1 95 When cop-
yright's operating assumption is correct, the prior restraint is not
particularly troubling because it is merely a short-term sacrifice in pur-
suit of the greater goal of encouraging the creation and dissemination
of the expression at issue. Where the author never intends to dissemi-
nate his or her expression, however, copyright serves not as "the en-
gine of free expression" 196 but as an instrument of speech
suppression. The laudable "right of first publication" becomes a lam-
entable "right of no publication."
This serves as a rebuttal to an issue that has been looming over
my litany of complaints about "copyrightis": if online authors gener-
ally don't care about the entitlement that copyright automatically
grants them, and their online audience also routinely ignores the enti-
tlement and proceeds to copy and distribute at will, then why is
copyrightis a problem at all? We now see one answer: it allows those
who want to keep their works private to use copyright as an instru-
ment of censorship.
One might expect copyright law's main First Amendment stand-
in, the fair use doctrine, to mediate this dispute between privacy and
public interest.197 Fair use jurisprudence, however, has labored under
the same erroneous assumption about authors' desire to profit.
Courts usually view one of the four fair use factors, the nature of the
copyrighted work, 198 as weighing against the copyist whenever the
work is unpublished-regardless of whether the author ever intends
to publish.199 Likewise, when it comes to the fourth and most impor-
195 See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of
prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity.").
196 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 (" [T] he Framers intended copyright itself to be
the engine of free expression.").
197 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) (listing fair use among
copyright's "built-in First Amendment accommodations").
198 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000).
199 E.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding
that second factor weighs heavily in author's favor when work is unpublished even
absent intent to publish); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, CIV.A. No. 95-1107-A, 1996
WL 633131, at *7-8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996) (rejecting argument that "where a copy-
right owner intends never to exploit the right of first publication, the need to protect
that right diminishes and the scope of fair use correspondingly expands"). But see
Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 n.13 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (attaching no weight to "first publication right" when author "clearly has indi-
cated that it never intended to publish"); WILLIAM A. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 131-42 (2003) (arguing
that unpublished works whose author never intends to publish are particularly good
candidates for fair use).
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tant fair use factor, the use's effect on the market for the work,200
courts again ignore whether the author ever intends to publish the
work and thus find a market effect when there is no real market to be
affected. 20 1 This case law and the already uncertain nature of a fair
use defense produce a chilling effect: even those who seem to have a
good shot at winning a fair use argument cannot afford to take the
issue to court.
20 2
Another of copyright's free speech mechanisms, the idea/expres-
sion dichotomy,2 03 has played a role in the copyright-as-censorship
cases, but no more successfully than fair use. The author's argument
here is that the copyist could have conveyed the same information
through paraphrasing rather than verbatim copying, and it is an argu-
ment that some courts have accepted. 204 But even paraphrasing does
not always save the defendant, 20 5 and in any event it misses the point.
Copyright exists to incentivize the public dissemination of informa-
tion. The copyist should not have to conform to the particularities of
copyright's idea/expression dichotomy to escape liability when the au-
thor intends to withhold his or her expression from the public. In-
stead, copyright should play no role at all.
200 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
201 E.g., Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99 ("[T]he effect on the market for Salinger's letters
is not lessened by the fact that their author has disavowed any intention to publish
them during his lifetime.").
202 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 92, at 95-99 (describing documentary filmmaker's
decision not to engage in a seemingly obvious fair use because of fear of litigation and
other practical obstacles); Richard Byrne, Silent Treatment, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July
16, 2004, at A14 (describing recall of book due to mere threat of lawsuit despite argu-
able fair use defense for excerpting ninety-four lines of material).
203 "[C] opyright's idea/expression dichotomy 'strike [s] a definitional balance be-
tween the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication
of facts while still protecting an author's expression.'" Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539) (second
alteration in original); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (listing
idea/expression dichotomy among copyright's "built-in First Amendment
accommodations").
204 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 n.* (1971) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (distinguishing copyright cases from other cases involving prior
restraints because "copyright laws, of course, protect only the form of expression and
not the ideas expressed").
205 Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97 ("[P] rotected expression has been 'used' whether it has
been quoted verbatim or only paraphrased.").
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3. Resurrecting the Formalities
Copyright's current role as an instrument of censorship is ironic,
given that it was a deliberate renunciation of censorship that gave
birth to modern copyright law almost three hundred years ago. In
1710, the British Parliament passed the Statute of Anne,20 6 which re-
jected the existing copyright system under which the Tudor monarchs
and their successors had granted royal monopolies to printing houses
as a means to control the content of books.20 7 Parliament focused
instead on a new notion-i.e., that copyright should provide a prop-
erty right to authors, not publishers, with the goal being "the Encour-
agement of Learned Men to Compose and Write useful Books."20 8
Today, the ubiquity of digital architecture serves to Encourage an
unprecedented number of Learned Men (and Women) to Write use-
ful Books, and more. Yet as information technology has advanced,
copyright has regressed, becoming too omnipresent and too intrusive.
Fortunately, we can find an answer to this dilemma in copyright's past
as well: the venerable formalities.
a. Publication
If copyright should play no role in regulating the copying and
distribution of a work whose author never intends to publish it, then
the obvious solution is to resurrect publication as a threshold require-
ment for federal copyright protection. Copyright should ensure,
rather than assume, that publication is the author's goal by withhold-
ing its exclusive rights from those who have not published their works
or who have no demonstrable plans to publish. The "right of first
publication" would thus remain a copyright matter, but the "right of
no publication" would revert to privacy law.
Of course, the law is not the primary regulator of behavior in the
privacy realm. That honor belongs not to legal modalities, but to ar-
chitectural modalities. Consider the enormous extralegal, real world
advantage that privacy-minded plaintiffs possess: if they do not want
their writings made public, they can simply lock them up. Indeed, the
law has traditionally made such architectural efforts a precondition to
its grant of certain entitlements. Privacy torts apply only to disclosure
206 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed
Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein men-
tioned, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.) [hereinafter Statute of Anne].
207 Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding
the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. Rnv. 1119, 1134-42 (1983).
208 Statute of Anne pmbl.
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of that which the plaintiff has not left open to public inspection. 209
Whether you can sue for trespass or ejectment may depend on
whether you built and maintained a fence to keep out unwanted traf-
fic. 2 10 The repo man can take a debtor's car from the driveway, but
not from the padlocked shed behind the house.
211
Intellectual property law routinely uses similar preconditions to
separate privacy-minded innovators from those who want to market
their creations using an alienable property right. Trade secret protec-
tion of an unpublished innovation is conditioned on the inventor's
desire to keep the innovation private and on the architectural and
legal steps he or she takes to realize that goal. 212 If the inventor
chooses instead to market the innovation, and thus reveal it to the
public, then a legal regime designed to facilitate commodification in-
tervenes-patent law-and substitutes a property right for trade se-
cret's privacy interest.213 Likewise, a private citizen may bring a
common-law tort claim for invasion of privacy when his or her likeness
is used in trade without consent. 214 But when the injury derives from
uncompensated publicity rather than unwanted publicity-think of
professional athletes or actors who choose to market their celebrity-
the cause of action is based on the property entitlement found in
rights of publicity, not the personal injury underpinnings of privacy
law. 215
Resurrecting publication as a copyright requirement simply ap-
plies this sensible and seasoned intellectual property distinction to the
protection of works of authorship. If an author prefers privacy to pub-
lication, then a legal regime designed to protect privacy should gov-
ern-i.e., privacy torts and other state law premised on architectural
209 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977) ("[T]here is no liabil-
ity for giving further publicity to what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the public
eye.").
210 E.g., Rice v. Miller, 238 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1976) (holding that realty owner
successfully defeated claim of prescriptive easement by physically blocking path); see
also Lofland v. Truitt, 260 A.2d 909 (Del. Ch. 1969) (finding prescriptive easement
where realty owner failed to maintain impediments to trespass).
211 Butler v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 829 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that
Mississippi law allows secured creditor to repossess debtor's vehicle from debtor's
driveway); Henderson v. Sec. Nat'l Bank, 140 Cal. Rptr. 388 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding
that repossession of debtor's vehicle from locked garage constituted conversion).
212 Gibson, supra note 15, at 220.
213 See Lichtman, supra note 119, at 231 & n.43.
214 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C & cmt. b.
215 See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Public-
ity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127, 167-78 (1993) (discussing propertization of right of
privacy).
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efforts to maintain secrecy. 216 If instead the author wants to market
the work and profit therefrom, then a legal regime designed to facili-
tate that choice and convey a property right should govern: federal
copyright law. As mentioned above, the old definition of publication
would need some updating so as to cover both the traditional notion
of distribution through print copies and latter-day notions of distribu-
tion through broadcasting, streaming media, and other more ephem-
eral means of reaching the public. But once we make this adjustment,
we will once again have a copyright system that encourages both crea-
tion and dissemination of creative expression.
b. Notice
Of course, resurrecting publication as a sine qua non of copyright
will cure only those symptoms of copyrightis that have to do with the
specter of censorship. It does nothing for Joe, our amateur movie
reviewer who wants to publish yet cares nothing for copyright protec-
tion. Here, however, we can call on another venerable copyright for-
mality-notice-to provide the answer. The argument against notice
as a copyright prerequisite in the print era was that few authors would
incur the expense of publishing a work absent an intent to profit.
Why then should the law require them to jump through an additional
hoop simply to demonstrate their desire for a copyright? As discussed
above, however, it makes little sense in the age of the Internet for
copyright to attach upon mere creation, or even publication, of a
work when the instruments of creation and publication are both
widely available and practically free.
Copyright should accordingly require for-profit authors to de-
clare their commercial intent by displaying a copyright notice on their
works, as was the case for all but twenty-eight years of U.S. copyright
history.2 17 Those many other authors who prefer not to restrict the
216 States could revive the standards of common-law copyright to regulate this be-
havior, but the nascent privacy entitlements that Warren and Brandeis first articulated
in 1890 may by now have matured enough to provide relief without invoking the
incongruous rubric of "copyright." See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A
(restating modern rights of privacy); cf David W. Melville & Harvey S. Perlman, Protec-
tion for Works of Authorship Through the Law of Unfair Competition: Right of Publicity and
Common Law Copyright Reconsidered, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 363, 367 (1998) (arguing that
"creation of rules for artistic works analogous to those governing trade secrets would
provide sufficient protection for unfixed works").
217 See Sprigman, supra note 2, at 491-95; see also Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a
Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 740 (2003) ("[Clopyright law might want to distin-
guish authors whose expressive activities are motivated by copyright from authors for
whom copyright was an afterthought.").
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copying and dissemination of their works could simply refrain from
affixing a notice and thereby enrich the public domain. Copyright
could even develop intermediate sets of entitlements through more
sophisticated and flexible forms of notice, as open source does for
software: one notice when the author wants full copyright protection,
another when the only desideratum is attribution, another when copy-
ing is permitted but not adaptation, and so forth. To some extent, the
Creative Commons movement has done this by providing the public
with a set of copyright licenses and associated notices that it can use to
publish its works.218 (For example, an author who objects only to un-
authorized commercial use of his or her work can affix a Creative
Commons "Some Rights Reserved" notice to it, which directs the
viewer to the corresponding license. 219) But because Creative Com-
mons is a voluntary grassroots effort, it can neither compel use of its
notices nor be assured of attracting a critical mass of authors-let
alone those authors whose cooperation is needed the most: the for-
profit, full-copyright crowd. 220 In contrast, a top-down, government
mandated requirement would both ensure universal participation in
the notice regime and provide a more comprehensive starting point
for flexible, intermediate licensing.
22'
A resurrected notice requirement could do more than facilitate
intermediate licensing and donations to the public domain. Like its
pre-1989 predecessor, the new notice could include the author's
name and the year that the work's copyright term began to run-i.e.,
the year of publication-and could thereby give the public some idea
of when the copyright is due to expire. This would work well for insti-
tutionally authored works, for which the date of expiration depends in
218 See Creative Commons, Choosing a License, http://creativecommons.org/
about/licenses (last visited Sept. 5, 2005). Christopher Sprigman has suggested using
Creative Commons licenses as a model for a flexible, govemment-backed menu of
notices. Sprigman, supra note 2, at 564.
219 See Creative Commons, A Spectrum of Rights, http://creativecommons.org/
about/licenses/comicsl (last visited Sept. 5, 2005).
220 Another problem with a bottom-up system of licensing is the risk that its decen-
tralized nature might lead to a proliferation of confusing and poorly drafted licenses,
thus undermining the flexibility that is its greatest advantage. Cf Robert W.
Gomulkiewicz, De-Bugging Open Source Software Licensing, 64 U. PIT. L. REv. 75 (2002)
(calling for standards organization that can keep open-source licenses consistent and
comprehensible).
221 See Merges, supra note 148, at 201-02 (noting that "no private initiative will
ever quite match the ability of the statute to channel copyright owners into a uniform,
widely understood standard practice" and proposing government-sanctioned interme-
diate license); Samuelson et al., supra note 113, at 2426-29 (exploring use of software
depository as centralized exchange for low-cost licensing).
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part on when the work was first published. 222 For individual authors,
the notice requirement would work less well, because expiration de-
pends on when the author dies, rather than on the date of publica-
tionZ23-but even here notice would provide helpful information: the
name of the author whose death would trigger the expiration clock.
And in both cases, including the name of the copyright owner in the
notice would lower search costs for potential licensees.
The main downside of resurrecting the notice formality is that
unwary authors will lose their copyrights if they fail to affix a notice.
But for almost the entirety of American copyright history, authors
faced this consequence-yet the creative culture still flourished. In
any event, the alternative is worse: automatically attaching copyright
to millions of works whose authors would prefer to see them enter the
public domain, or at least be governed by some intermediate, more
permissive regime. In other words, someone has to comply with a legal
formality to achieve their goals: either market-minded authors or al-
truistic authors. It is the former who seek to profit from a government
entitlement, and it therefore makes sense for the burden to fall on
them.224
Moreover, the law can assuage the harsh consequence of a notice
requirement by adopting an evenhanded, equitable approach to for-
feit of copyright-e.g., by allowing an author to cure any inadvertent
omission of notice within a reasonable period of time after publica-
tion. Innocent infringement that took place before the omission was
discovered might be subject to injunction only, rather than damages,
with the unwitting infringer being allowed to complete any enterprise
undertaken in reasonable reliance on the absence of notice. Pur-
poseful removal or alteration of another's notice would be subject to
harsh punishment.225
222 The copyright term for works created by institutional authors today is ninety-
five years from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is sooner. 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(c) (2000). If publication were revived as a threshold requirement, we could
either get rid of the alternative 120-year term (perhaps as an incentive for authors to
publish earlier) or keep it. In either event, including the date of first publication
within the notice would allow the public to calculate a date after which the copyright
would definitely have expired.
223 Id. § 302(a).
224 "If welfare recipients can be denied their benefits because they fail to complete
a benefits form properly, then I can't see the unfairness in requiring those who de-
mand state support to defend their monopoly similarly by filling out a registration
form." LESSIG, supra note 47, at 251.
225 Many of these safeguards were part of copyright law before the formalities
withered away. See 1961 REPORT, supra note 150, at 61-67.
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Some forms of content distribution might be incompatible with
notice. For example, it would be difficult to "affix" a notice to a live
musical performance. The same might be said for digitally streamed
audio, although the more high-tech the distribution method the more
likely that some effective form of notice could be coded into the
software and hardware. 226 In these instances, however, the require-
ment would not be as important because the form of distribution
would be inherently resistant to unauthorized copying. It could there-
fore be waived, and the public would be presumed to know-as it is
now-which content is covered by copyright.
c. Registration, Renewal, and Deposit
A final cure for copyrightis can be found in the registration for-
mality. Requiring authors to register their works as a condition of
copyright would serve much the same purpose as the notice require-
ment, in that those with no desire to obtain copyright protection
could simply forgo registration and thereby donate their works to the
public domain. In some instances registration may be better suited
for this role because it would be feasible even when the author's pri-
mary means of distribution precludes effective notice. Indeed, under
the predecessor to the current copyright act, works distributed in a
format that resisted notice-such as plays, lectures, and musical per-
formances-could secure copyright protection through registration
and deposit alone.
2 27
But registration best aids copyright's cause not as a declaration of
intent to secure copyright in the first place, but as a declaration of
intent to continue one's copyright. The theory here is simple: most
works that succeed commercially do so within the first few years of
their copyright. Continuing the copyright after that point thus often
impoverishes the public domain, with no countervailing benefit to the
author. For example, between 1883 and 1964, the copyright term
could be doubled from twenty-eight years to fifty-six if the author sim-
ply filed for renewal, yet less than eleven percent of copyrights were
renewed, even though renewal was a relatively painless and cheap
process. 228
226 See, e.g., Creative Commons, Metadata Embedding, http://creativecommons.
org/technology/embedding (last visited Sept. 5, 2005) (discussing how to embed
Creative Commons licenses in code). But see infra Part III.B.2 (arguing that copyright
should not rely extensively on high-tech solutions to problems that digital technology
presents).
227 See supra note 150.
228 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U.
CHI. L. REv. 471, 473 (2003).
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Today copyright lasts much longer (a minimum of seventy years)
with no need for renewal. Requiring authors to register their works
and then renew the registration after a period of years would there-
fore release into the public domain works that were once-but are no
longer-commercially viable; their copyright owners would not
bother going through the trouble of renewing even at a low cost. For
this reason, commentators from William Landes and Richard Posner
to Lawrence Lessig have proposed reviving the registration/renewal
requirement.
2 29
Registration provides other benefits as well. For example, regis-
tration has always required the deposit of one or more copies of the
work.230 Making these copies available for public inspection 23 1 or
(better yet) for inclusion in the collection of the Library of Con-
gress 23 2 directly promotes copyright's goal of dissemination of creative
expression to the public without significantly affecting authorial in-
centive. Of course, if every copyright-eligible work were to be
archived in this way, storage might become problematic, even for a
digital depository. But as already discussed, one of the benefits of
making copyright an opt-in system is that many works would not be
registered, as many authors would not care about protecting their ex-
pression, so not all copyright-eligible works would be archived. In any
event, current deposit regulations exclude certain categories of
works, 233 a practice that could continue if storage problems arise.
Perhaps most important, registration could help lower trouble-
some search costs. Consider that a potential licensee of a work must
incur the expense of identifying and tracking down the copyright
owner before licensing negotiations can even begin. If the copyright
owner's name and address are not readily available, these search costs
might prove prohibitive, even when the copyright owner would gladly
229 LESSIG, supra note 47, at 251 (proposing series of fifteen renewable five-year
terms); Landes & Posner, supra note 228, at 518 (concluding that "a system of indefi-
nite renewals (or one that combines renewals with a maximum duration) may enable
society to have its cake and eat it too").
230 1961 REPORT, supra note 150, at 71.
231 See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
232 Current copyright law ostensibly requires deposit of published works to the
collections of the Library of Congress, but the requirement is almost completely
toothless. The statute makes it abundantly clear that such deposit is not a prerequi-
site to copyright protection and cannot lead to forfeiture of one's copyright. The
only penalty for noncompliance is a small fine, which is not imposed unless the regis-
ter of copyrights first makes a written demand that goes unheeded. 17 U.S.C.
§ 407(a), (d) (2000).
233 Id. § 407(c); 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c) (2004).
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have issued the license for a reasonable price, or for free. 23 4 If the law
required authors to include their names in a copyright notice and re-
cord any subsequent assignments of copyright in a public registry,
these costs could be avoided or significantly reduced. Indeed, the law
imposes strict recordation requirements on those who transfer inter-
ests in real property, even though the real property often provides
sufficient indications of ownership on its face. 23 5 Why then should
transfers of interest in intellectual property-whose provenance is in-
herently difficult to ascertain-not be subject to equally strict recorda-
tion rules?
Here again we can look to old-school copyright for a model. The
first federal Copyright Act required registration of each work in the
office of local federal district court clerk, with a strict recordation pro-
cedure, sealed certificate of title, and announcement of the registra-
tion in the newspaper.2 3 6 The first major copyright revision, in 1831,
further required the local registries to be sent to the Secretary of State
annually,237 and three years later Congress mandated the recordation
of all written assignment instruments transferring copyright owner-
ship.23 8 The statutes were unclear as to whether the registries were
open to public inspection, but the predecessor to the current act,
passed in 1909, cleared up any ambiguity; it explicitly provided for
public inspection and also required indexed catalogs of all registra-
tions to be distributed regularly to postmasters and customs officers
and made available to the public for a small fee.2 39 Even more signifi-
cant was a provision that voided any assignment of a copyright not
recorded with the register of copyrights.
2 40
The current statute continues to provide for registration, but it is
mandatory only when the copyright owner wants to file suit, and then
only for U.S. works.24 1 It also allows (but does not require) a party to
record any transfer of its interest in copyright, or indeed of any docu-
ment "pertaining to a copyright"; a sufficiently detailed recordation
constitutes constructive notice of the transfer if the work itself is regis-
234 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 248 (2003) (Breyer,J., dissenting) (discussing
"search costs that themselves may prevent reproduction even where the author has no
objection"); see also Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739 (Jan. 26, 2005) (requesting
comment for Copyright Office study of works whose owners are difficult to locate).
235 Sprigman, supra note 2, at 500.
236 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 124, 125.
237 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 4, 4 Stat. 436, 437.
238 Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 157, § 1, 4 Stat. 728, 728.
239 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 56-58, 35 Stat. 1075, 1086.
240 Id. § 44, 35 Stat. at 1084.
241 See supra note 158.
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tered. 242 (Curiously, Congress has also enacted a recordation scheme
specific to shareware. 243 ) Copyright Office records are indexed and
open to public inspection, and for a fee the Office will itself conduct a
search of its records.
2 4 4
Copyright's history thus provides a model for mandatory copy-
right recordation, and current law provides a modern-day framework.
All that remains is to combine the two into a compulsory system. Of
course, making any formality mandatory imposes new costs on au-
thors-or, more accurately, revives old costs. In the print era, how-
ever, authors managed to bear them without impoverishing
themselves or our culture. And today the costs should be even less
prohibitive, because we can use the Internet and automated systems to




The foregoing discussion explains how copyright's formalities
can address discrete problems in copyright law, such as censorship, a
needlessly impoverished public domain, confusion about what entitle-
ments govern what works, and high search costs for potential licen-
sees. If resurrecting the formalities did no more than that, it would be
a worthwhile endeavor. When we consider their collective effect, how-
ever, a final benefit appears-one that transcends the details of copy-
right policy and helps fulfill the democratizing promise of the
information age.
As already discussed, the development of digital architecture and
the Internet represents an important second stage in the democratiza-
tion of copyrighted content. The initial stage was the development of
broadcasting technology, which first enabled content providers to lib-
erate content from a specific res and deliver it to everyone in a more
ephemeral form. Digital networks have taken the broadcasting
revolution one step further by turning it into a two-way street. In an
242 17 U.S.C. § 205(a), (c) (2000). Recordation is mandatory only when a party
wishes to perfect a security interest in a registered copyright. See, e.g., In re World
Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d 1120, 1128-32 (9th Cir. 2002).
243 Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§ 805, 104 Stat. 5089, 5136; see also 37 C.F.R. § 201.26 (2004) (implementing
regulations).
244 17 U.S.C. § 705.
245 See Sprigman, supra note 2, at 546; Robert E. Kahn, Deposit, Registration and
Recordation in an Electronic Copyright Management System, http://www.cni.org/docs/ima.
ip-workshop/Kahn.html (last updated July 3, 2002).
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online world, everyone can be both a content provider and an audi-
ence member.
The architecture of digital networks is thus inherently egalitarian.
Therefore, as Yochai Benkler has cogently argued, nondiscriminatory
access to a free and universally available public network can signifi-
cantly advance collective goals of productivity, democracy, autonomy,
and social justice.246 Yet even if that architectural condition is satis-
fied-i.e., even if everyone has free access to the Internet-such ac-
cess would fail to realize its democratizing potential if online content
is subject to clumsy default rules that automatically propertize any-
thing that satisfies minimal standards of fixation and originality.
In other words, copyright's current rules keep us from achieving
legally what is now possible (and desirable) architecturally. Under
these rules, members of the public face two equally objectionable
choices when they go online. They can either ignore copyright law,
and thus use the expression of others as they see fit, or they can com-
ply with copyright law, and thus refrain from all copying and sharing
of anything that looks like creative expression. The former option
harms the legitimate interests of for-profit authors. The latter option
unacceptably hinders participation in our newly accessible democratic
culture.
Small wonder, then, that piracy is rampant and that surveys show
the prevailing attitude toward copyright is one of either incomprehen-
sion or disrespect.2 47 Given copyright's complexity and resistance to
the layperson's expectations, can we be surprised at the widespread
downloading of copyrighted music (to cite one prominent example)?
Those downloaders who don't understand copyright law probably
think they are doing nothing wrong. Those who do understand copy-
right law also understand that millions of acts of online infringement
take place every day-the forwarding of e-mails, the caching of web
pages, etc.-and that no one cares. Why then should they expect any-
246 Yochai Benkler, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, Freedom in the Commons:
Towards a Political Economy of Information, Lecture at the Second Annual Meredith
and Kip Frey Lecture in Intellectual Property at Duke Law School (Mar. 22, 2002), in
52 DuKE L.J. 1245, 1246-47 (2003).
247 One survey found that sixty-one percent of those who download music don't
care about its copyright status, and just thirty-one percent say that it's a concern for
them. AMANDA LENHART & SUSANNAH Fox, DOWNLOADING FREE Music: INTERNET Mu-
sic LOVERS DON'T THINK IT'S STEALING 12 (2000), available at http://www.pewin-
ternet.org/pdfs/PIPOnlineMusicReport2.pdf. In another survey, more than twice
as many respondents thought it was a serious crime to drive forty miles per hour when
the speed limit is twenty-five than to make illegal copies of software. RCK HARBAUGH
& RAHUL KHEMKA, DOES COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT ENCOURAGE PIRAcY? 6 (2001), avail-
able at http://econ.mckenna.edu/papers/2000-14.pdf.
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thing more than a wink and a nod when they engage in other forms of
digital infringement? The problem thus extends beyond copyright
education to copyright substance. Even an educated public cannot be
expected to respect and consistently conform to copyright law if copy-
right owners themselves admit that most digital infringement is
inconsequential.
Resurrecting copyright's formalities will bring the reality of copy-
right closer to the public's reasonable expectations. By inhibiting cen-
sorship, reducing the amount of unnecessarily protected content, and
attaching a notice to those works that remain copyrighted, the formal-
ities eliminate significant legal obstacles to realizing network technol-
ogy's architectural promise and are thus likely to improve public
respect for, and compliance with, copyright law. If copyright is no
longer an impenetrable and counterintuitive morass of rules, the
layperson is more likely to comply with its rules and embrace a culture
of creativity, both online and offline.
2 48
B. Battling Technological Hegemony
1. The Threat
Resurrecting copyright's formalities also addresses one last troub-
lesome issue at the intersection of digital architecture and copyright
law: the well documented possibility that information technology will
supplant copyright law as the primary regulatory modality for works of
creative expression.24 9 Because copyright exists not to enrich authors,
but to enrich the culture, it provides both private property rights and
public privileges. For example, its exclusive rights expire after a set
period of time,250 to allow the public unfettered use of a work and to
prevent authors from extracting monopoly rents after they have
earned a sufficient return on their investment in creativity. Likewise,
the first sale doctrine prevents copyright owners from controlling the
aftermarket for copies of their works.2 51 The idea/expression dichot-
248 Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Book,
48 VILL. L. REv. 13, 18 (2003) ("[I]f individuals could access and use digitalized copy-
righted works in old, familiar ways, perhaps they would also restrain themselves to
analog levels of unauthorized copyright uses and infringements."); Litman, Revising
Copyright, supra note 45, at 44 (arguing that "conforming the law more closely to pop-
ular expectations" would not only "ease enforcement" but also "make mass education
about the benefits of intellectual property law more appealing" (footnote omitted)).
249 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 13, at 507-10 (exploring nonlegal possibilities for
regulating intellectual property); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formation of
Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REv. 553, 568-69 (1998) (same).
250 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
251 Id. § 109(a).
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omy ensures that some of an author's creativity goes immediately into
the public domain. 25 2 And the fair use defense excuses copyright in-
fringement that is unlikely to harm the work's market or that provides
some greater social benefit.
2 53
As already discussed, however, each of these important legal safe-
guards presumes the existence of certain architectural conditions.
The expiration of a work's copyright is meaningless if the work is not
actually available to the public. The first sale doctrine applies only if
the copyright owner has chosen to market the work in freestanding,
alienable copies. The idea/expression dichotomy has little effect if
those who would use a work's ideas never see them. And fair use is
fairly useless if the putative user cannot access the work.
Digital technology puts these architectural conditions at risk and
thus threatens to upset the balance that the safeguards strike. For
example, suppose the music industry develops a pay-per-listen satellite
technology that allows anyone anywhere to hear any song through a
small radio receiver. If this were music's predominant distribution
model, the first sale doctrine would be useless, because songs would
not be available in a freestanding format. The fair user-who has the
right to make use of the song without the copyright owner's permis-
sion-would be out of luck as well. And the expiration of the copy-
right in a song would not cure these ills; the song might be in the
public domain as a legal matter, but as an architectural matter the
copyright owner would still control it.
This "celestial jukebox" 25 4 may lie some years in the future, but
we can see signs of the impending technological hegemony that it ex-
emplifies. Content on demand is already here, with pay-per-view mov-
ies and streaming video and audio online. Even when a work is
released in freestanding form, encryption technology and copy pro-
tection measures can architecturally forestall uses of it that copyright
law would permit-e.g., by making it difficult to extract unprotected
facts from a copyrighted database or to copy a film excerpt from a
DVD for fair use purposes. And the constitutional principle of free
speech that undergirds the fair user's privilege is useless against pri-
vate architectural efforts, as they involve no state action. 255
252 Id. § 102(b).
253 Id. § 107.
254 "Celestial jukebox" is Paul Goldstein's clever term for any technologically ad-
vanced content-on-demand system. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 21-22
(rev. ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2003) (1994); see also id. at 170-71 (discussing techno-
logical threat to copyright's "safety valves").
255 Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on
Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 592 (1998); see alsoJane C. Ginsburg,
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What's more, content providers have successfully sought the en-
actment of technolegical regulations-i.e., legal protections for their
restrictive technologies. Thus we have the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act,256 which began as a criminal prohibition against hacking
into classified government computers but has since expanded into a
general prohibition, complete with a private civil remedy, that covers
the unauthorized access to and alteration of information in almost
any digital technology over which Congress can exert Commerce
Clause jurisdiction. 257 More famous, or infamous, is the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act (DMCA),258 which among other things out-
laws the removal or falsification of copyright management
information,259 encourages online service providers to adopt techno-
logical measures designed to protect copyrighted material against un-
authorized use, 260 and imposes civil and criminal liability on those
who circumvent technological measures designed to control access to
a copyrighted work.
261
To the extent that these technolegical enactments simply provide
legal backing for technology that protects a copyright owner's exclu-
sive rights, they are unobjectionable. The problem, however, is that
the protection that technology provides is not coextensive with copy-
right's entitlements and safeguards. If a film on DVD has built-in copy
protection-and most of them do262-that protection will endure
even after the copyright expires, making the film's entry into the pub-
lic domain merely theoretical. If one wants access to the facts in a
password-protected database, one needs the password, even though
the facts themselves are in the public domain. A fair user who wants
From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copy-
right Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 113, 130 (2003) ("And if hard copies and
unprotected digital copies do disappear in a brave new pay-per-access world, then the
threat to transformative fair use becomes more than a paranoid fantasy.").
256 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, §§ 2101-2103, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190-92 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030).
257 Gibson, supra note 15, at 199; see also United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 497
(7th Cir. 2005) (upholding CFAA conviction of student who hacked city's computer-
based radio system for emergency services).
258 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 and 18 U.S.C.).
259 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000).
260 Id. § 512(i).
261 Id. § 1201(a) (substantive provision); id. § 1203 (civil liability); id. § 1204
(criminal liability).
262 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing DVD copy protection technology).
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to parody a pay-per-listen song must pay to get access to it just like
anyone else.
One can understand why technological protections are not more
sensitive to copyright concerns. Today's digital architecture is not
particularly good at "coding" for copyright-i.e., at discerning
whether a given act implicates the amorphous legal rights that copy-
right comprises. Take fair use, for example. Judges and attorneys
have a hard enough time figuring out whether fair use applies ex post.
How much harder must it be to write a computer program that can
recognize ex ante when someone seeking access to a work is or is not a
fair user? Moreover, copyright safeguards by their nature involve ac-
tivities from which copyright owners do not make any money. One
cannot therefore expect either copyright owners or the technologists
who work for them to spend much time designing their products to
take account of fair use and its similarly unprofitable safeguards-at
least, not without some external incentive.
In contrast, one might reasonably expect to find some accommo-
dation of copyright's safeguards in the legal provisions that buttress
technological protections. After all, the reach of these technolegical
enactments is determined not by technological happenstance, but by
the deliberate decisions of legislators. Yet the anticircumvention pro-
visions of the DMCA are as insensitive to copyright's safeguards as the
technology they protect: bypassing technologies that restrict access to
a copyrighted work constitutes a DMCA violation even if the ensuing
use of the work is non-infringing.2 63 Indeed, if technological access
protections keep the public from even viewing a digitized work, the
public is unable to determine whether the work is protected by copy-
right in the first place; in other words, we may not know whether copy-
right and the DMCA apply until we circumvent the protections-and
then it's too late. Technology therefore gives copyright owners a way
to control their works without any concern for the balance that we
find (or at least aspire to) in copyright law, and technolegical enact-
ments simply reinforce this capability.
We could combat this technological hegemony by amending
technolegical laws so that they supplement copyright owners' entitle-
ments without obstructing the exercise of public privileges. For exam-
ple, in recent years Congress has considered revising the DMCA to
impose liability only when circumvention of access controls results in
263 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a). In contrast, circumventing a technology that does not
control access-such as copy protection code-is not a DMCA violation.
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actual copyright infringement.264 Even in the absence of such an
amendment, courts have grown increasingly dubious of efforts to use
the DMCA to protect noncopyright interests.2 65 Either legislatively or
judicially, then, technolegical regulation could focus more on copy-
right principles and less on technical infringements, in the same way
that the fair use jurisprudence permits the making of unauthorized
copies in the course of reverse engineering code to get at the unpro-
tected "ideas" necessary for interoperability266 and allows the tempo-
rary copying of code when the copyist's goal is merely to extract the
uncopyrightable facts within.267 The problem with this approach,
however, is that-like the copyright safeguards themselves-it oper-
ates on a purely legal level. Amending the DMCA and other overly
expansive technolegical enactments is all well and good as far as it
goes, but it does nothing to address the purely architectural aspect of
the problem, namely that access controls and copy protection would
still prevent the public from exercising its privileges.
One response to this architectural conundrum is to recognize
that technological protections are not bulletproof. A skilled technolo-
gist may be able to evade access controls or copy protection technolo-
gies. Indeed, the whole point of the DMCA's anticircumvention
provisions is to deter such hacking. One might therefore conclude
that as long as we adjust the DMCA to permit hacking done in pursuit
of some legitimate objective, we can leave the rest to the hackers; they
will free digital content from its technological shackles and copy-
right's safeguards will once more have practical value. 268
This thinking, however, rests on two faulty premises. First, it as-
sumes that hackers will consistently succeed in circumventing techno-
264 See Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong. § 5
(2003).
265 See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178,
1203-04 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting DMCA claim that would have inhibited competi-
tion in market for garage door openers); Lexmark Int'l v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 537-45 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting DMCA claim that would have
inhibited competition in market for printer toner cartridges).
266 See supra Part II.A.
267 E.g., Nautical Solutions Mktg., Inc. v. Boats.com, No. 8:02-CV-760-T-23TGW,
2004 WL 783121, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2004); Evolution, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, 342
F. Supp. 2d 943, 956 (D. Kan. 2004).
268 E.g., Strasser, supra note 37, 108 ("[I]f a piece of software imposed con-
straints that ordinary consumers would be unable to notice during the normal opera-
tion of the software, chances are that somewhere in the world, a skillful programmer
would nevertheless discover the constraints at some point and, assuming they are
overreaching or otherwise newsworthy, would disseminate its discovery over the In-
ternet to the world at large.").
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logical protections. The conventional wisdom is that no system is
secure,269 and it is true that some nascent attempts at copy protection
have proved laughably easy to evade. 270 But we cannot be sure that
this will always be the case, any more than we can be sure that decom-
pilation of object code will consistently succeed in revealing interoper-
ability standards. Given the mercurial nature of technological
innovation, we should be wary of tying legal doctrine to a current par-
ticularity of digital architecture.
Second, and more important, hacking generally only helps hack-
ers. Those who lack the skills to circumvent technological protections
must therefore rely on the kindness of strangers, who may or may not
share the unskilled public's views regarding which products should be
liberated and distributed-if they bother to share the products of
their hacking at all. Hackers may occasionally hit upon and distribute
a technology that allows the rest of us to evade technological protec-
tions without learning how to hack, but for those fearful of technolog-
ical hegemony that is a slim reed on which to rest.271 As with reverse
engineering, then, hacking would simply substitute a world of techno-
logical cans and cannots for a world of legal haves and have-nots-a
preferable eventuality, perhaps, but not an optimal one.
In any event, even if hacking does consistently triumph over con-
trol and the ability to hack becomes ubiquitous, hacking is not an at-
tractive solution because of the risk of overuse. It works only if
hackers limit themselves to content to which they have a legal right.
In practice, however, many hackers would undoubtedly use their skills
to obtain material that a sensible information policy would require
269 "Any electronic on-line system is vulnerable to attack. That is close to an axiom
in the field of computer security. So too, therefore, are self-help systems vulnerable."
Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 401 (1999)
(footnote omitted); see also David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Com-
mon Law, 72 Miss. L.J. 143, 200-01 (2002) (noting that "each new level of security
seems inevitably to be defeated by a loose, worldwide network of computer-savvy
adolescents").
270 E.g., Kevin Coughlin, CD Technology Isn't So Protected, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
NJ.), Oct. 8, 2003, at 4 (describing how college student defeated copy protection
technology merely by holding down Shift key as CD was inserted into computer); Matt
Richtel, Digital Lock? Try a Hairpin, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2002, § 4, at 12 (describing
how music CD copy protection could be defeated through use of magic marker).
271 See Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management
Systems, 15 HIARV.J.L. & TECH. 41, 82 (2001) ("Even the most user-friendly circumven-
tion technologies will require some threshold level of technological competence.");
Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Manage-
ment, "97 MICH. L. REv. 462, 526 (1998) (noting that despite existence of devices for
circumventing videotapes' copy-protection measures "there is no evidence suggesting
that substantial numbers of ordinary consumers use them").
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them to pay for. Such piracy might expose them to copyright liability,
but copyright owners will likely lack the resources necessary to obtain
redress for diffuse acts of individual infringement. 272 Again, legal en-
titlements alone will not solve the problem.
2. The Solution
A world of unfettered technological competition will therefore
not yield a socially optimal outcome. If copyright's balance between
private incentive and public benefit is to have its intended effect, we
cannot afford for digital architecture to become a "Wild West of tech-
nological one-upmanship that favors the better technologist."273 We
need a new form of technolegical regulation, one that is sensitive to
both technological and authorial innovation.
One such regulatory device would be a bright-line ban on all
technological constraints that might impede the exercise of copy-
right's public privileges. Under this approach, access controls that in-
sulate both copyrighted and public domain materials would have to
go, as would copy protection technologies that are incapable of distin-
guishing between fair users and others. This approach, however, is
clearly a nonstarter. It is unrealistic politically, would stifle beneficial
innovation in both the technological and commercial spheres, and
would encourage widespread piracy even by those without hacking
skills.
We could go to the other extreme and encourage the adoption of
high-tech, code-intensive implementations of copyright's safeguards.
The common term for this approach is digital rights management
(DRM) .274 Kenneth Dam, for example, has argued that digital devel-
opers can accommodate public privileges on a voluntary basis and sug-
gests ways in which the first sale and fair use doctrines could plausibly
be implemented in code. 2 75 Although he recognizes that current
technology might not seem capable of capturing the complex legal
272 Gibson, supra note 15, at 196.
273 Id. at 169-70; see also Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A
Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 53-54
(2004) (arguing that law must regulate technology to preserve free speech values).
274 The "digital rights management" term is accurate insofar as it describes the
technological implementation of copyright entitlements, but quickly becomes decep-
tive if used to regulate conduct in a way that does not accord with established legal
"rights." See Dam, supra note 269, at 396-97 (eschewing terms "copyright manage-
ment systems" and "rights management systems" because "the underlying information
need not be copyrighted" but may instead be trade secrets or facts or even pirated
content).
275 Id. at 400 (discussing first sale); id. at 403-05 (discussing fair use).
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balance inherent in copyright's safeguards, Dam wisely warns us that
"anyone who sells technology short by saying 'it can't be done' has
very little experience with technology."
276
Dam's proposal, however, fails to overcome the obstacle identi-
fied above, namely that copyright owners have little reason to volunta-
rily expend the time and resources necessary to facilitate unprofitable
public privileges. It is true that in certain instances a content provider
might want to encourage fair use: a software developer may want to
give computer magazines free access to a program so that they will
publish reviews, or an academic may want to allow others to expand
on his or her research as long as credit is given. 277 But the situations
in which an author takes the time to accommodate uncompensated
uses are more the exception than the rule; one must remember that
first sale and fair use owe their origin to a long line of cases in which
copyright owners so resented the public's unauthorized conduct that
they filed suit.
278
Of course, DRM does not have to be voluntary. A legislative man-
date could give copyright owners the impetus needed to undertake
the technological facilitation of copyright safeguards. Dan Burk and
Julie Cohen have proposed such a framework for the implementation
of fair use, one that would automate certain customary, limited, and
therefore predictable aspects of the doctrine but would provide a neu-
tral human gatekeeper to mediate more uncertain claims of privi-
lege.279 Yet even this proposal shares the shortcomings of any
approach that involves detailed technical regulation, in that such reg-
ulation would require constant updating to remain current with the
ever-changing nature of DRM technology. It is hard to envision such
a system working absent a government agency tasked with flyspecking
276 Id. at 411. For one example of how technology might accommodate copy-
right's public privileges, see generally Deirdre Mulligan & Aaron Burstein, Implement-
ing Copyright Limitations in Rights Expression Languages (detailing species of
technological protection that would allow exercise of both producers' and users' legal
entitlements), in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 137 (Joan Feigenbaum ed., 2003).
277 Dam, supra note 269, at 403-04.
278 E.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908) (holding that
copyright's "right to vend" did not include right "to control all future retail sales");
Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1096 (3d Cir.
1988) (referring to first sale's "venerable lineage" that "finds its origins in the com-
mon law aversion to limiting the alienation of personal property"); Folsom v. Marsh, 9
F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) ("[A] fair and bona fide abridgment
of an original work, is not a piracy of the copyright of the author."); see also H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976) (noting that fair use statute merely codifies long line of
case law).
279 Burk & Cohen, supra note 271, at 59.
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DRM developments and issuing regulations on what technologies sat-
isfied the legislative mandate. The other alternative would be to es-
tablish a private right of action against digital publishers who fail to
adequately accommodate public privileges, but this alternative relies
on the dubious premise that fair users and others would have the re-
sources necessary to bring suit and could produce a court decision
timely enough to give guidance to the next generation of
technologists.
In fact, the more technologically intrusive the regulation, the
more likely it is to stifle private innovation that can serve authors and
the public alike. Digital architecture may pose a threat to copyright's
safeguards, but it obviously holds much promise for copyright's over-
all goal of encouraging the creation and dissemination of expressive
works. Apart from the democratizing effect of computer networks al-
ready discussed, consider the benefits of a digital distribution model
like the celestial jukebox described above. If such a technology ex-
isted-and its day is not far off-music lovers could experience un-
precedented convenience and choice; they could listen to any song, at
any time, without the need to purchase a fixed copy (let alone the
other twelve songs on the album that they don't want). Music publish-
ers could avoid the costs of making and distributing music in fixed
form and could pass those savings to the purchasing public. And even
if the celestial jukebox fails to materialize because of licensing hold-
outs, today's digital networks can help musicians reach their audi-
ences directly, without seeking financing from corporate
intermediaries. This lowers barriers to market entry and thus both
decreases prices and increases the variety of music available.
So we are faced with a paradox: the market is good at adapting to
changes in technology, but the government is not-yet only the gov-
ernment can ensure that private technology accommodates copy-
right's public privileges. The solution is to find a form of
technolegical regulation that would allow innovation to continue
while preserving the public's legal privileges. And once more we call
upon those low-tech copyright concepts, the registration and deposit
formalities.2 8
0
Here's how it would work. To procure copyright protection, an
author would first have to register with an administrative agency and
deposit an architecturally unfettered version of the work-what I have
elsewhere called a "re-reified" copy.28 1 The author would thereafter
280 See Sprigman, supra note 2, at 527 (noting that formalities mediated the ten-
sion between the First Amendment and copyright protections).
281 Gibson, supra note 15, at 172.
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be free to market the work in whatever form he or she likes; access
and copying controls would be wholly unregulated. The re-reified
copy, however, would remain in the depository, outside the author's
control, with access administered by a neutral gatekeeper. The re-re-
ified copy would thus provide a basis for exercise of the public privi-
leges. For example, reviewers, researchers, parodists, and other fair
users would be free to access and copy the work, as long as they
demonstrated their fair use bona fides. And when a work's copyright
expired, all restrictions on copying would disappear, no matter who
the copyist was. This purposely retrograde approach would give
meaning to copyright's safeguards and allow law to resume its proper
place as the primary behavioral constraint on copyrighted goods with-
out hindering valuable innovation in information technology.
This proposal is not without its problems. For one, it does noth-
ing to preserve the first sale doctrine because copyright owners would
still be allowed to use technological restrictions on alienability to con-
trol the aftermarket for their works. This is less of a drawback than it
might seem at first blush, however, because one purpose of the first
sale doctrine is to allow low-value users who cannot afford an author's
initial price to acquire the book in the aftermarket. 282 When copy-
right owners subject their works to architectural restraints on access
and alienability, however, they restrict opportunities for arbitrage,
which allows them to price discriminate-i.e., sell their works at one
price to high-value users and at a lower price to low-value users.
283
When this happens, those low-value users who depended on a thriving
aftermarket to acquire a work can get the work directly from the pub-
lisher instead, making first sale less important.
Another obvious shortcoming is that if the depository is to give
true meaning to the public's privileges, it would have to be widely
accessible to the public. The only way to achieve this goal would be
through a digital network that permits remote access. Once again,
then, we are faced with a familiar technological dilemma: how can
digital architecture prohibit unprivileged copying but facilitate fair
use? In other words, some DRM measures would be necessary even
under this supposedly low-tech solution, just as Dam proposes, as
would the use of a neutral human gatekeeper, as Burk and Cohen
propose. The technological challenge here, however, is not nearly as
formidable as in the other proposals, because they contemplate inte-
grating copyright's safeguards into the architecture of every copy of
282 Id. at 213.
283 See id. at 206-08. Price discrimination, however, is not a panacea for the ills of
technological hegemony. See id. at 212-15.
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every digital work. In contrast, the depository would have to fashion a
DRM solution for the re-reified copy alone. This narrow focus also
allows the depository to adjust more quickly than a dispersed system to
changes in the law-e.g., a judicial recalibration of fair use-and to
advances in DRM technology.
Two broader problems remain. First, a drawback of any formal
requirement for copyright protection is that it converts copyright
from a protection that arises through operation of law to an opt-in
regime. Those authors that view the re-reification requirement as too
burdensome might therefore decide not to create their works at all or
at least forgo copyright entirely. One way to minimize this occurrence
would be to apply the registration and deposit requirement only to
those works published in digital form, or (more narrow still) only to
those works published with technological restraints on access, copy-
ing, or distribution. Print publishers would not have to register unless
and until they later decide to "go digital," and failure to register would
forfeit copyright protection only for digital copying and distribution
of the work.
But those most likely to opt out would not be print publishers,
who need copyright's protection more than anyone. The real risk is
that digital publishers would decide that the copyright game is not
worth the re-reification candle and would decide to take their chances
with wholly technological protections. The instances of digital opt-out
would be few, however, because digital publishers must allow access to
their works in order to market them; no one will pay for a book that
cannot be read.2 8 4 The threat of hacking will thus loom large in a
market regulated only by technology, where one uncontrolled copy of
a work can doom its commercial prospects. Therefore, although
hacking is not a panacea for the problem of technological hegemony,
it serves as an excellent deterrent for any author tempted to forgo all
legal remedies and rely on technology alone to prevent unauthorized
copying and distribution; once the genie is out of the bottle, only cop-
yright has any hope of putting it back in. Moreover, some uses of a
work that infringe copyright will likely remain resistant to any form of
technological control-e.g., unauthorized public performance of a
song.28 5 In any event, a world in which authors forgo copyright in
favor of architectural protections is still better than a world in which
the law grants them the legal entitlement without any accompanying
technolegical regulation.
284 The exception, of course, is closed-code software. See supra Part I.A.
285 Lichtman, supra note 119, at 241.
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Finally, we have the opposite problem: not that authors would
ignore the depository system, but that the public would. Even if re-
reified works were widely available, fair users might be reluctant to use
them for fear that the use might compromise their anonymity. Of
even more concern is the specter of a watchful government agency or
its agent acting as gatekeeper for the exercise of fair use rights, which
are part and parcel of the right to free expression. 286 Burk and Co-
hen identify the anonymity concern and propose to resolve it through
a key escrow system, which might work here as well. 28 7 But for both
concerns, the best answer is that re-reification would be a supplement
to, rather than replacement for, traditional avenues of fair use. Fair
users would still be free to obtain a work the old-fashioned way-i.e.,
by buying a copy or otherwise paying for access. Nor is re-reification a
substitute for other measures that give meaning to copyright's safe-
guards, such as a DMCA amendment that permits unauthorized ac-
cess for fair use purposes or Cohen's "right to hack," which achieve
much the same result.28 8 In the end, then, reviving the formalities
may be just one step copyright must take to preserve its balance be-
tween private incentive and public benefit, but it is a necessary step.
CONCLUSION
The promise and threat that digital architecture represents are
not something that copyright law can address by tinkering with legal
entitlements. Architectural problems call for architectural solutions.
If copyright is to maintain its balance between private incentive and
public benefit-and between authorial innovation and technological
innovation-it needs "technolegical" tools that can regulate those
uses of technology that keep it from achieving its goals.
As it happens, the tools best suited to this task are not new, but
old. Indeed, the venerable concepts of publication, notice, registra-
tion, and deposit withdrew from copyright's front lines just as the
technology that now makes them indispensable was coming into its
own. Properly understood, these formalities are more than relics of
an antiquated copyright culture; they are timeless embodiments of in-
tellectual property principles-indeed, democratic values-that we
286 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) (listing fair use among
copyright's "built-in First Amendment accommodations").
287 Burk & Cohen, supra note 271, at 63-65.
288 SeeJulie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1089, 1141 (1998) (arguing that "[i]f the user privileges established by copy-
right... are to mean anything, users must be afforded affirmative rights to protect
themselves" including "a right to hack the digital code that implements and enforces
the challenged restriction").
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have lost sight of: free expression, public enlightenment, and trans-
parent governance. Thus their resurrection can provide the solution
to a variety of seemingly disparate copyright conundrums: closed
code, overpropertization, copyright as censorship, and technological
hegemony.
Regardless of whether getting rid of copyright's formalities was a
good idea in the twentieth century, then, their revival is vital in the
twenty-first. Resurrecting these retrograde concepts not only solves
discrete problems that digital architecture has caused, but also
refocuses copyright on its underlying justifications, with the familiar
formalities serving as both talisman and touchstone.
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